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The Singapore-Suzhou Industrial Park project was a landmark collaboration that saw the highest 
level of the Singapore and Chinese Governments working together for the first time to develop 
an industrial site that would see Singapore transferring its urban planning and software 
technological expertise to its Suzhou counterparts. However, the partnership fell through mid-
way, and the cooperation witnessed a change in ownership over the project that was both highly 
publicized and embarrassing, especially for the Singapore Government just five years after it was 
conceived. This abrupt development in the collaboration led to much speculation about what 
went wrong, who was to be blamed for the demise in this partnership, and how feasible a project 
of this nature was in the first place. 
 
Using new sources such as raw statistical data, personal correspondence and private interviews 
with top-level bureaucrats, this research argues that the odds were stacked against Singapore from 
the start and that to add to the problem, the Singapore Government did not sufficiently take 
into consideration differences in working styles and objectives of the parties involved, resulting in 
miscommunication, and reluctance on the part of their counterparts to comply and cooperate. 
Neither was the Singapore Government adequately armed with the necessary knowledge about 
the existing economic climate and investment patterns within China and the Suzhou region to 
tailor programs and policies that were attractive and suitable for the foreign investors that they 
were targeting to recruit into the park.  These fundamental issues all contributed to the lackluster 
performance of the industrial park, and the Singapore Government’s decision to withdraw from 
the project in 1999.  
 
Given that the Singapore-Suzhou Industrial Park was meant to be a model for future Sino-
Singaporean collaborations and how these two countries have since branched off to explore other 
projects, this is a timely analysis of what went wrong, and what can be learnt from this 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION –  
THE CHINA- SINGAPORE SUZHOU INDUSTRIAL PARK?  
A SUCCESS (OR NOT)? 
 
What is the significance of the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) for existing and 
future Sino-Singaporean collaborations? Can the Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park collaboration 
be considered a success? Why did such a high level national government-to-government project 
fall apart mid-way only to pick up again after a major share structure reshuffling? These are 
questions that remain important because the SIP has been a significant learning experience for 
both the Chinese Government as well as the Singapore Government. Through it, it has paved 
the way for subsequent large-scale Sino-Singaporean collaborations, both at the government and 
the private sector level. Because this national level collaboration attracted so much international 
profile and because of its deep impact on Sino-Singaporean cooperation and business relations, 
there are enough justifications to examine in detail how the SIP came about and what led to its 
current development.  
 
Uncertainty about the reasons for SIP’s supposed failure and Singapore’s withdrawal from the 
collaboration still exist today, and as Singapore embarks on an increasing number of projects 
with Chinese partners in China, there are underlying concerns that new ventures may turn out 
the way the SIP did, for various earlier studies of the SIP had concluded that it did not live up to 
initial expectations and was plagued by many problems that Singapore could not address (Perry 
and Yeoh 2001; Yeoh 2003).  References are thus often inevitably drawn to the SIP experience 
 1
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and it is important for any policy maker, investor or entrepreneur to know why such problems 
occurred so that one could prevent them from happening again.  
 
1.1 Previous Research on the SIP and their Limitations 
 
Now in its fourteenth year of operation, the SIP has in this period undergone 2 major share 
restructuring exercises. The first major reshuffling occurred in 2001, with the Singapore 
consortium swapping its majority control of 65% which it held since the start of the project to 
the Chinese consortium to become the new minority shareholder maintaining just 35% of the 
shares within the SIP (China –Suzhou Industrial Park calm over share adjustment 2001; Smooth 
Handover of SIP to China 2001). The most recent share restructuring phase was exercised in 
2005 with both the Singapore and Chinese consortiums diluting their shares in favour of 3 new 
foreign shareholders coming on board the SIP (Main Developer of SIP Expands Capital and Shares 
2005). 
 
The idea of the SIP was conceived in late 1992 and subsequently developed jointly by both the 
Singapore and Chinese governments in 1994 as a project by which Singapore would transfer its 
software and management skills and technology to its Chinese counterparts (Sino-Singapore 
Industrial Park Starts Operation 1994; Singapore management software: ‘key to Suzhou project’s 
success’ 1994). Once and if proven to be successful, the SIP model of cooperation and 
management was meant to be replicated in other parts of China to help open up markets and 
stimulate domestic growth and technological acquisition in the forms of hardware infrastructure 
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and software capabilities transfer. This project was unique from the start because it involved 
active participation from officials and departments of the highest level in both governments. This 
was the first time such high level inter-government joint-venture collaboration of this nature was 
taking place in China. Such a high-profile project has of course had its share of expectations and 
controversies. Over the years, numerous media reports and academic journals have covered the 
developments of the SIP from a variety of angles, with a significant amount focusing on the 
alleged problems, and their causes that occurred within the project itself such as alleged profit-
losses, management conflicts, finger-pointing accusations, inter-governmental squabbles and 
doubts over the success of software transference program. Most seem to see the transfer of the 
SIP management to the Chinese in 2001 as an indication that the initial plans had failed, or that 
they had not lived up to earlier expectations.  
 
The SIP from A Sociological Economic Perspective 
An existing line of research stresses the social component of interaction between agents in the SIP 
collaboration. In one of the more in-depth attempts at the study of the SIP recently, Pereira’s 
State Collaboration and Development Strategies in China – The Case of the China-Singapore Suzhou 
Industrial Park (1992-2002), explains the developments and failure of the SIP from a sociological 
point of view, focusing on how social interaction between separate economic agents could greatly 
affect the dynamics and outcome of a business relationship. Arguing that the demise in the 
relationship was due in part to internal sociological factors such as differences in management 
culture and unfamiliarity with the investment environment and climate, as well as unforeseen 
external factors in the macro-environment namely the Asian Financial Crisis, Pereira emphasized 
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how differences in government expectations and changing national economic development 
strategies by both governments contributed to the lack-lustre performance of the SIP (Pereira, 
2001; 2004). While this approach provides a macro approach to analyzing the developments in 
the SIP, it assumes that the effects of such internal miscommunication and external impacts like 
the Asian Financial Crisis are unique to the SIP and the Singapore experience alone. However 
Singapore was not the first to launch a large scale industrial park program in China, and other 
foreign investors, especially those not used to the Chinese culture, would have found 
communication and integration into the Chinese economic business system just as trying. The 
author does not explain why cultural difference and communication issues were more significant 
in the case of the SIP. Likewise, external international shocks would have left other similar 
ventures just as vulnerable but again, the above approach does not make clear why the SIP  was 
so affected by the Asian Financial Crisis, while its neighbouring parks, who did not have the level 
of national support that the SIP had, were able to tide themselves through the crisis.  
 
Institutional and Software Transference 
Another area of focus on the SIP collaboration has been on the software transference program 
between the Singapore and Chinese Governments. Arguing that the Singapore-Suzhou 
knowledge transfer process has been largely unsuccessful, Thomas identifies the main problems 
as that of the Singaporean model being not well fitted for  the Chinese context, and of the 
Suzhou Government not being motivated enough to make the transfer a success (Thomas, 2001).  
The problem with this approach and research is that it offers only a superficial and theoretical 
assessment of the institutional and software transference process between the two countries 
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involved without analyzing in detail the specific mechanisms in which both countries sought to 
transfer knowledge from one to the other. By merely assessing the success of the SIP software 
transfer program from the lens of conventional theoretical perspectives or historical examples, 
this approach considerably fails to take into account the perspectives of the participants involved, 
and in particular, how each party assessed what ‘success’ meant for them. Similarly, the 
Singapore model was not meant to be replicated wholesale into Suzhou or other parts of China. 
The importance of collaboration and the software transference was meant to be meaningful at 
the conceptual and ideological levels, to equip the recipient country with receptiveness for 
change and improvement, and not for China to copy wholesale the model and practices of the 
Singapore Government. 
 
The SIP as a Conduit for Sino-Singapore Relations 
Other research has sought to explain the SIP from the perspective of international relations and 
security survival strategies. Research on the vulnerabilities and behaviour of small states in the 
international system focus on how small states like Singapore adopt certain policy options vis-à-
vis rising major powers such as China to ensure its sustained survival, economic development and 
importance internationally. Shee argues that the SIP collaboration was a means by which 
Singapore sought to get its foothold in China and also to create leverage by providing the 
Chinese Government with the necessities it required to integrate further into the international 
market economy (Shee, 2005). The SIP was also seen as a conduit for advancing Sino-
Singaporean relations by providing a platform by which government bureaucrats and economic 
agents from both countries could interact regularly to promote greater understanding and create 
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opportunities for future engagement (Lee, 2001). From a demand-supply perspective, the SIP 
was derived out of the mutual needs of Singapore to establish its presence regionally, as well as 
for China to upgrade itself and attract international foreign investors. Singapore was an apparent 
strategic partner because of its ability to play middleman and link China with the rest of the 
modern developed economic world (Wong and Goldbum, 2000). These explanations however 
over-estimated the importance of the SIP for Sino-Singapore relations as well as over-state 
China’s need to ‘learn’ and cooperate with Singapore. The above views also assume that the 
nature of relations at the national level would automatically spill over to or influence other levels 
of society such as local governments and local economic agents. In reality, there is often a 
disjuncture between the motivations and interests of all these various groups of actors. In the case 
of the SIP, local government politics undermined national efforts to reinvigorate the 
collaboration, proving that for foreign investments like the SIP to be successful in China, they 
had to grasp the importance of local Chinese politics and embed themselves in this dense 
network of social and political relationships (Yeung 2000; 2004).  
 
1.2 A Multi-Causal Approach to the SIP 
 
The success of the SIP is often measured in narrow terms of the financial performance of the 
industrial park and of the restructuring of the shareholding as indication of the failure of the SIP. 
But the SIP is a massive project and its development covers more than just one or two groups of 
people, and more than a single set of issues. Stakeholders run the gamut from national 
governments, local government institutions and civil servants, recipient country’s or region’s 
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population and targeted foreign investors, while issues are as diverse as political jockeying and 
how investors determine their choice of investment location. For a project of this nature, it is 
necessary to take into consideration the interaction between the various groups of actors and the 
inter-connectivity between the identified issues and problems when assessing the performance of 
the SIP. While existing approaches throw light on some of the causes for the developments and 
problems that the SIP faced, they fail to address many other important questions such as: Why 
was the SIP unable to perform as well as its competitors despite all the strong level of support 
that it had from both the national Governments at their highest levels?; Why was the SIP unable 
to attract more foreign investment given the numerous tax incentives and policies it supposedly 
had over other neighboring industrial parks in addition to its superior infrastructure?; Why did 
Singapore pull out so soon when it had supposedly claimed that it was going into the project 
long-term and were aware as well as prepared for the initial losses that may be incurred?;  Why 
was the local Suzhou Municipal Government more supportive of the rival industrial park despite 
the Central Government’s directives to promote the SIP first?; and why did the Chinese Central 
Government not take a stronger stand in censuring the local government when allegations of 
unfair practices against Singapore surfaced? 
 
This research analyzes the SIP in its totality, by both evaluating distinct issues as individual 
subjects and some of the relevant linkages between them.  With so many components and agents 
contributing to the development of the SIP, this research argues that it is not feasible to view the 
SIP from one broad angle and evaluate it based on its overall financial performance as earlier 
assessments of the SIP had seem to favour, for this approach does not take into consideration 
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variations in success at the various level and the reasons behind these discrepancies. The objective 
of this thesis is to assess the feasibility and effectiveness of exporting the Singapore experience 
and its models of development and knowledge skill sets to China. Given the vast differences 
between the two countries in terms of land and population size, abundance of resources, political 
governance, current state of economic development growth and even socio-cultural and business 
approaches, it is useful to analyze how feasible it is to transfer policy guidelines and teachings 
across border. This research  thus breaks down key areas of cooperation within this collaboration, 
and examines how and in what areas the collaboration has yielded fruitful results, and why in 
other instances, the performance of the SIP has not lived up to expectations.  
 
This thesis argues that it is difficult for Singapore to transfer its expertise on a large scale across 
borders, especially if the receiving parties and it possess conditions that are too dissimilar, and if 
communication often gets lost in translation.  Such knowledge transfer and collaboration are 
more successful if efforts are focused on a confined subject matter, and if exchanges are intensive, 
personalized and conducted at regular intervals, such that any confusion or disagreements can 
surface, and be addressed by the relevant personnel at first chance. When a project involves 
parties at different levels of governance, Singapore needs to comprehend the subtle linkages and 
the various vested interests of these parties that may affect Singapore’s nature of involvement. It 
also argues, that Singapore should exercise a large degree of flexibility in fine-tuning its approach 
to such collaborations, and understand the unique and ever-changing needs and landscape of 
their host country, and not over-estimate their value and abilities especially in a situation 
whereby the recipient is able to choose from alternative sources other than Singapore.   
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1.3 Methodology 
 
This research deviates from existing work conducted on the SIP on three different levels: 
 
i. Interviews with Government Bureaucrats and Top-Level Policy Makers 
First, previous research had also conducted interviews with informants to provide insight as to 
why the SIP turned out the way it did. Their key informants however, were mostly working level 
executives or operational employees, and end-users like individuals who rented space in the SIP, 
who were only able to provide their personal and at times, superficial assessment of policy 
outcomes.  For an in-depth and meaningful assessment of the policies implemented in the SIP, it 
is actually necessary to understand foremost the motivations and objectives behind the minds of 
the policy-makers in the conception of certain policy initiatives as they reveal intended strategies 
and purposes that may not be privy or understood by downstream individuals.  The dynamics of 
communication and the exchange process between the policy-makers when deciding on the 
approaches to be adopted are hence important factors to be considered in any assessment of the 
SIP. This research achieves this by using in-depth personal interviews with both past and present 
high-ranking policy makers within the SIP as well as former government bureaucrats from both  
the Singapore and Suzhou Municipal Governments to provide an explanation for the actions 
taken.  Several of these individuals were and are still key decision makers within the SIP, and 
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ii. Quantitative Evidence and Analysis 
Second, earlier research mostly adopted a qualitative and descriptive to the SIP, relying on 
common published statistics and second-hand data as their sources.  The problem with this is 
that there are many discrepancies in the figures published, and there is no actual way of assessing 
their reliability without getting access to the various sources and be able to sift out the raw data. 
Also they tend to be accumulated numbers that do not highlight specific trends and behaviors in 
a particular issue over a fixed period of time. This research is unique in that it obtained raw 
figures and information from the SIP and relevant statistical bureaus, which allowed the 
researcher to sift out critical patterns that may point to alternative explanations for the 
performance of the collaboration. Some of these raw data, particularly involving the investment 
figures within the SIP, have never been published before, and are significant in that they help to 
clarify any discrepancies that exist about how well the SIP has been doing financially and in 
terms of attracting foreign investment.  
 
iii. Personal Correspondence and Documents 
Last, correspondence between bureaucrats of the Singapore, Central and Local Chinese 
Governments, and the Consortium members are also examined to understand the concerns and 
dynamics of interaction between key decision makers in the project.  These correspondences 
between the various vested interest parties provide an intriguing insight into how those involved 
in the project perceived each other and arrived at a decision at the various stages of the 
collaboration process. This aspect is significant because it sheds light on the mentality of 
 10
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government officials going into this collaboration and whether the performance of the SIP was 
affected by the dynamics of communication between these interest parties.  
 
1.4 Research Sources 
 
Key Informants 
Key interviewees were selected on the basis of their position at or association with the SIP, the 
time period in which they were on the project, as well as their ability and willingness to provide 
unfettered information about the collaboration that is not known to the public. Because of the 
sensitive nature of the collaboration and the involvement of two national governments, this 
research relied on the effect of snow-balling to gain access to informants who would otherwise be 
reluctant to discuss the subject or offer alternative views outside the official discourse in public. 
All individuals interviewed held or are still holding, positions of directorship, general managers, 
heads of departments within the SIP or senior bureaucratic positions within the Singapore and 
Suzhou Municipal Governments. These are individuals who were directly involved in and in 
charge of policy making as well as the implementation of these policies in the SIP and most of 
them have spent a minimum of seven years working in or with the SIP. These interviewees thus 
had the appropriate vantage point to provide information on the process of setting up of the SIP, 
the milestones achieved, the hurdles faced, and the current and future prospects for the growth of 
the SIP.  
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The snow-ball effect was particularly useful for this process of elite interviewing. An initial list of 
potential interviewees was identified but had to be adjusted on a number of occasions as 
conducted interviews reveal contents that point to another focal point. With exception to the 
first interviewee, a former senior Singapore Government bureaucrat whom the researcher 
approached personally, all other interviewees were contacted through their personal connections 
with each another. Eventually, a total of seven individuals, consisting of four Singaporean 
citizens and three Chinese citizens, were interviewed for this research, with the remaining three 
individuals citing confidentiality and the sensitivity of the subject due to their current positions 
within the industrial park as reasons for not being able to participate in this research. Those 
interviewed with the exception of one, all gave permission for their interviews to be recorded and 
for the contents to be used in this research, however on the condition that their identities be kept 
anonymous. Out of the four Singaporean respondents interviewed, one was a senior Singapore 
Government bureaucrat who was closely related to the SIP from 1993 till around 2003; the 
second was of a senior managerial position in the SIP for almost a decade from 1994; the third 
and fourth respondents joined the SIP at the senior management level in 2004. The three 
Chinese citizens interviewed comprised of: one local Suzhou Municipal Government senior 
official who oversaw the progress of the SIP from 1993-2004 and was also a representative at the 
National People’s Congress; one local Suzhou Municipal Government senior official closely 
related to the Software Transfer Program; and one Jiangsu Provincial official who was chosen to 
join the SIP in 1994 to spearhead foreign direct investment initiatives and policies and is still 
present at the senior level within the SIP today. 
 
 12
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While small, this list is considered to be sufficient for the purpose of this study for several reasons. 
First, the pool of these elites is very limited. Not many individuals were or are at the relevant top 
level of governance to be able to understand the progress of the SIP from a policy-making point 
of view. Access to them is often difficult due to the secrecy that still shrouds this project given 
the disputes that surfaced and the disagreements about profitability and success especially for the 
years before 2001 when the industrial park was alleged to have been making substantial losses. 
Second, the final list of interviewees consisted of individuals whom represent both the Singapore 
and China perspective at the highest working level, and for the angle of this research, were 
individual who were best able to provide relevant observations about any changes and basis for 
these before and after the share structure change in 2001.  
 
Statistics and Other Secondary Materials 
Rather than simply relying on published accumulated figures on the respective SIPAC and 
CSSD websites and reported news figures which are commonly used as primary sources in earlier 
research done on the SIP, raw statistical data broken down by months and years were obtained 
especially for the foreign investment flow and pattern into the SIP. These reveal trends that 
cannot be reflected in accumulated figures. Local statistical bureaus also offered a good source of 
information regarding the investment and employment conditions within the particular region 
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Research Limitations 
At the outset, there are several limitations to this research methodology.  
 
i. Response Bias 
First, there may be response bias since most of these high-ranking respondents would intuitively 
have vested interests in projecting the SIP as a success, particularly if they are still employed 
within the industrial park management or if they were/are responsible for some of the 
development and design of certain policies. The interviews were also formulated using open-
ended questions based on the language abilities and work nature of the interviewees meaning 
that they do not follow any formal framework which poses a particular problem if the 
interviewees give ambiguous or conflicting responses and the researcher has to interpret the 
individual’s actual position on a particular issue based on other responses throughout the 
interview. This research minimizes this form of biasness by selecting both individuals still 
working within the SIP and cross-referencing their responses with individuals who had just 
retired or left the SIP within the last one to three years whom over the course of this research, 
proved to be a lot more forthcoming in their assessment and criticism of the park. Repeated 
interviews with all these respondents were also conducted to ensure that such misrepresentations 
or misinterpretations are minimized. 
 
ii. Limited Pool of Interviewees 
Second, the selection of individuals selected was in part constrained by who would be willing to 
be interviewed for the subject material. Although there may have been other key informants who 
 14
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could have provided relevant information and data, but by having these top-level individuals 
make recommendations for subsequent interviews, this research is confident that a number of the 
most appropriate individuals available have been included in this research project.  
 
iii. Accuracy of Statistical Information 
The choice of what kind of statistical information to be used also posed a challenge for this 
research. A thorough reading of past news reports and articles over the years assessing the 
financial performance of the SIP yielded numbers that did not tally with one another or with the 
official statistics published on the various SIP related government websites, and were according 
to some interviewees, far from accurate. Some reliance was thus placed on the accuracy and 
extensive data set provided by the Suzhou Annual Statistic Yearbooks to verify these numbers, 
but again, because some of these statistics, especially with regards to tax collection and 
revenue/income, are sometimes calculated using different formulas on a yearly basis, they may at 
times be not suitable for direct comparison. However this research managed to obtain raw data 
information about the SIP’s performance especially with regards to foreign investment inflow, 
and a cross referencing of all relevant material available was done to ensure that the final sources 
used were as reliable as possible. 
 
iv. ‘Weakness’ of  adopting a Multi-Causal Framework 
Last, this research adopts a multi-causal approach in examining the SIP. The potential problem 
with this is that because it explores a particular subject from a number of angles that it runs the 
risk of being descriptive versus prescriptive. Identifying multiple causes that explain the progress 
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of the SIP all various also does not mean that this list of causes are exhaustive of all the possible 
issues which may have contributed to the current development of the SIP. To prevent the 
research findings from being merely descriptive and historical, statistical data and quantitative 
analysis are used to balance qualitative research, and more importantly, to tease out new trends 
and patterns for analysis. Although this research is not able to confirm that the causes raise in this 
thesis are fully representative of all the possible issues that relate to the development of the SIP, 
this research is however, confident that the issues covered in this research, are amongst the most 
important ones that explain why the SIP was not as successful as it set out to be, as they were 
confirmed as being critical to the outcome of the SIP as verified and raised independently by the 
respondents that were interviewed.. They were similarly chosen for their individual merit as a 
subject matter and how they related to one another. Also by evaluating portions of the SIP as 
individual segments within a larger framework, the findings of this research are also able to be 
utilized in situations outside of the SIP. 
 
1.5 Chapter Summary 
 
The following chapter focuses on the events leading up to the conception of the SIP 
collaboration. In particular it focuses on the dynamics of the negotiation process between the 
agents involved both at the national as well as individual level to identify motivations behind 
initial decisions and behavior. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the early hurdles 
encountered, as well as to assess the mindset of key agents toward the collaboration and why the 
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SIP faced resistance so early during the proposal stages and how this also influenced the 
subsequent progress of the project.  
 
Chapter 3 next analyzes in detail the software transference program between the Singapore and 
Suzhou Municipal Governments. Arguing that this aspect of the collaboration has been yielded 
more fruitful results, it looks at what mechanisms were utilized to facilitate the knowledge 
transfer, and how these have made the overall software transfer program an effective tool for 
change and innovation. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 look at aspects and programs of the SIP that have not been as successful as the 
software transference program. Tackling the subject of foreign investment levels in the SIP, 
Chapter 4 argues that one of the main reasons why the SIP has been unsuccessful in attracting its 
target investors is because of its lack of understanding of specific investor and industry’s 
requirements, and because of its late entry in terms of providing industrial park services in the 
Suzhou region. As a result, its competitiveness was eroded in part by its own internal structural 
faults and not by external shocks such as the Asian Financial Crisis. An examination of Japanese 
investment patterns in the SIP within Chapter 4 supports this argument. 
 
Chapter 5 continues by examining how the local Chinese stakeholders in the SIP collaboration, 
namely the local governments and its employees, perceived the SIP and its spillover benefits. It 
analyzes some of the policies and rewards by the SND and argues that the SIP was not favored by 
the local agents because the rewards that they got from the SIP were less or not as attractive as 
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what other industrial parks could give them. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing the 
lessons that can be learnt from the SIP experience particularly in terms of exporting the 
Singapore experience abroad and how the Singapore Government and investors can take heed of 
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CHAPTER 2: THE SINGAPORE-SUZHOU INDUSTRIAL PARK 
                            --- THE BEGINNING 
 
Chapter 2 examines the background to the conception and development of the SIP, focusing in 
particular on the dynamics of the negotiation process and how both the Singapore Government 
and Suzhou Municipal Government came to a consensus on the nature of the collaboration. The 
purpose of this chapter is to identify the differences and disagreements between both parties with 
regards to their individual expectations and nature of participation in the collaboration. This 
would reveal the state of relationship between both governments and each of their mindset going 
into the joint-venture and how a mismatch in expectations contributed to subsequent 
misunderstanding and opposing attitudes about the progress of the SIP.  
 
2.1 Deng Xiaoping’s South China Tour and the Call for Reforms 
 
At the start of 1992 during his tour of Southern China, Deng Xiaoping made a series of what 
came to be known as the ‘South China speeches’ calling for accelerated reform and economic 
development (Xinhua News Agency, 31 March 1992). Within a matter of months, China saw a 
surge of development all over the country, giving a much needed boost to the Chinese economy. 
In this positive national economic climate of 1992, various localities, departments and 
enterprises, especially the inland provinces, all showed great enthusiasm toward the reforms. 
They initiated various measures to boost reform and the opening up of their regions and units 
and played a very important role in enlarging the scope of market functions. At the same time, as 
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a result of the adoption of an expansionary monetary policy to spur economic growth, local 
governments at various levels devoted their attention to setting up development zones and 
launching infrastructure investment projects, setting off another round of economy bubbles in 
the form of crazes for development zones, real estate, bonds, stocks and futures. In October 1992, 
the 14th National Congress of the CPC thus set the reform target of establishing a socialist 
market economy (The 14th National Congress Decision, 1993). It was in light of these 
macroeconomic reform and new directives that the idea of a national scale inter-governmental 
cooperation was broached between Singapore and Suzhou. 
 
2.2 Selection of the Site for the Singapore Township Development: The Process 
 
Then Senior Minister (SM) Lee Kuan Yew and then Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Ong Teng 
Cheong visited Suzhou in October 1992 following Deng Xiaoping’s praise of Singapore as being 
a model that China could look to in terms of planned development and economic progress 
(South China Morning Post, 13 April 1992). According to a former Singapore Government 
bureaucrat, the idea for a collaboration between the Singapore and Suzhou governments 
apparently came about during a car journey from Suzhou to Hangzhou, when the Mayor of 
Suzhou Zhang Xinsheng expressed opened admiration for the Singapore development model to 
DPM Ong and suggested that both parties explore cooperation on the basis of transferring 
Singapore’s software expertise to Suzhou given Deng Xiaoping’s admiration of Singapore’s model 
of development. It was during this car journey that DPM Ong supposedly first suggested that 
one possible area of collaboration was for Singapore to help develop a township in Suzhou. The 
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Cabinet was apparently briefed on this subject of conversation subsequently, but it appeared that 
no developments occurred immediately. DPM did however after his visit, publicly suggested in 
the media that China let Singapore fully develop an area within Suzhou or Wuxi to demonstrate 
the strengths of the Singapore development model (The Straits Times, 10 October 1992). 
 
In December 1992, at the invitation of DPM Ong, a delegation from the Suzhou Municipal 
Goverment, led by Mayor Zhang, visited Singapore.  During his private meeting with DPM 
Ong, Mayor Zhang expressed that as an integral part of the new economic reform direction, 
China was in the midst of opening up in many areas and that Singapore was increasingly 
becoming an important investor in China (Reuters News, 23 December 1992). Impressed with 
Singapore’s Jurong Town Corporation’s (JTC) industrial park development scheme, the Mayor 
of Suzhou wanted to discuss setting up an industrial town in Suzhou. He was keen to tap on 
Singapore’s experience and added that China’s development was now focused around the 
Yangtze River Delta, and hence it would be timely for Singapore to participate in the 
development of Suzhou which was a rich area, and enjoyed substantial geographical advantages 
over the others. Suzhou was also ideal since its market was not yet saturated, whereas Guangdong 
was already dominated by Hong Kong investors, Fujian by Taiwanese investors, Shandong by 
South Korean investors, and Liaoning by Japanese investors. The concept as loosely discussed 
between DPM Ong and Mayor Zhang was for the Chinese Government to agree to set aside an 
area to be developed as a new town modelled after the Singapore Jurong Industrial Town. It 
would then be managed by the Suzhou authorities with delegated powers to enforce rules and 
regulations similar to those in Singapore. 
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As there was still a keen level of interest on the part of the Chinese, DPM Ong then apparently 
decided that the Singapore government should perhaps form a delegation to study the effects of 
collaborating with the Suzhou government. Hence according to this bureaucrat, at the invitation 
of Mayor Zhang, they visited Suzhou from February to March 1993 to explore the feasibility of 
the proposal to develop an industrial township in Suzhou. During this first feasibility trip, the 
Singapore delegation visited four development sites as identified by the Suzhou Municipal 
Government and both the Singapore and Suzhou teams concurred that the site east of Suzhou 
city, adjacent to Jinji Lake was the most suitable for the development of an industrial township. 
A subsequent fact finding trip was made in April 1993 whereby the Singapore delegation 
presented their initial conceptual plan to the Suzhou Municipal Government. This preliminary 
concept plan for the proposed township development was prepared by the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority (URA) of Singapore and presented to Mayor Zhang. This preliminary 
plan included proposed location and physical layout plans of the township at the Jinji Lake site, 
and plans for future expansion east of Jinji Lake. The Suzhou Municipal Government expressed 
keen interest in the vision and the concept plan. 
 
When the fact-finding team returned to Singapore in May and identified the current site of the 
SIP after their fact-finding trip, that SM Lee and DPM Ong made a visit to China to make 
another round of evaluation. During this trip, an in-principle agreement to set up an industrial 
park in Suzhou was signed between China and Singapore by the Suzhou Municipal Government 
and the Singapore Labour Foundation International respectively (South China Morning Post, 27 
October 2003). However, Singapore had still not decided whether the newly signed and 
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proposed Suzhou Township would be the project whereby the Singapore government would 
transfer its software management skills. The agreement signed merely loosely stated that a joint-
industrial park project would be developed by the Suzhou and Singapore governments 
respectively. 
 
Why Suzhou? It was the obvious choice 
 
Given the stiff competition between local governments to open up their economies and perform 
to the levels of expectations as set out by the Central Government during the 14th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), other provinces, on learning the ongoing 
developments between the Suzhou and Singapore governments, also sought aggressively to have a 
slice of the pie. This became more apparent when the Singapore government made known 
publicly that it still had not decided which province to impart its software management skills to. 
Some of the provinces that pitched their land to the Singapore government included Shandong 
who offered a 77 square kilometre site and Ningbo who offered land within their Economic and 
Technical Development Zone (Business Times, 7 July 1993).  Shandong in particular, went all 
out to match Suzhou’s offered site of 70 square kilometres, and potentially stood in Suzhou’s 
way of being selected due to its impressive marketing efforts and Singapore’s Prime Minister 
(PM) Goh Chok Tong’s support (Business Times, 8 July 1993).  
 
Contrary to media reports and public accounts, the choice of Suzhou as Singapore’s flagship 
township development with software transference, was clear to the Singapore government and 
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SM Lee much earlier on. Soon after the initial fact-finding missions in May and around the time 
Shandong expressed its interest, SM Lee and DPM Ong personally made a trip to China to 
evaluate the various provincial. According to a senior bureaucrat who was closely involved in the 
fact-finding trips in site selection, and who was also became deeply involved with the Singapore 
Consortium, the choice became clear during this trip. 
 
“Lee Kuan Yew and Ong Teng Cheong visited Suzhou again, and it was not just Suzhou (we 
visited), but we visited Shandong also because at that point, Goh Chok Tong said ‘Why not 
Shandong? Why Suzhou?’ So Lee Kuan Yew also visited Shandong together with Ong Teng 
Cheong and in that trip, he (Lee Kuan Yew) made up his mind. It was very clear. The two 
places in terms of location, Suzhou was much better. Suzhou had the hinterland, Shandong 
had nothing. So I think all this was in its (Suzhou) favour. So they came back and the 
Cabinet decided. Ok…Suzhou.” 
      (Interview, April 2007 Singapore) 
 
It was reported in the media that the selection between Shandong and Suzhou was a supposedly 
difficult decision, one that according to SM Lee himself at a press conference in July 1993, 
would take between 2 to 3 months for the Singapore government to come to a decision (The 
Straits Times, 12 July 1993). However just a month later in the middle of August, Singapore had 
decided to transfer its development software to Suzhou (The Asian Wall Street Journal, 13 August 
1993). According to a few of the respondents, the Singapore government had probably already 
reached an internal consensus and preference for Suzhou much earlier on, but perhaps chose to 
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delay going public with its decision so as to keep open the possibility of further business 
opportunities with Shandong and the other cities.  
 
In another indication that Suzhou was already the definitive forerunner amongst the various 
municipalities and sites vying for the Singapore government’s software transfer program and 
expertise on top of the development of an industrial township based on the Singapore model, 
Singapore officials were already contemplating the nature of collaboration between Suzhou and 
Singapore as early as April 1993 after DPM Ong and SM Lee’s visit to Suzhou with Mayor 
Zhang and Deng Pufang. From interviews, it was learned that basic idea of the structure for 
cooperation was thought up on route back during the flight back to Singapore and it was decided 
then that there should be three separate levels of cooperation that were inter-related in the bigger 
scheme of things, but that still maintained a degree of autonomy and separation of duties at each 
decision-making level. These initial three levels of cooperation would consist of a joint 
committee to be headed jointly by the highest level of national governments, a steering 
committee comprising of the Suzhou government officials and representatives from the 
Singapore Labour Foundation (SLF) whom signed the first Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Municipal Government of Suzhou and SLF International on the Suzhou Industrial 
Township Development Proposal during the April Suzhou visit, and finally a joint-venture 
company set up between Suzhou and a Singapore consortium, led by SLF International initially 
to provide consultancy and related services for the township development, such as town planning, 
property development, marketing and estate management. However the formal working 
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structure was only decided upon and enforced when Beijing gave the green light to go ahead in 
late 1993 after its initial cool reception to the proposal which will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
2.3 Model of the SIP Collaboration 
 
The foremost principle guiding the development of this township was that it had to be a private 
driven entity, with direct access to national government support. After multiple rounds of 
discussions and lengthy negotiations, the final structure of the SIP was conceived and consisted 
of the following bodies: The China-Singapore Joint Steering Council (JSC); the China-
Singapore Joint Working Committee (JWC); Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Committee 
(SIPAC) and; the China-Singapore Suzhou Development Company (CSSD) (Figure 2.1). 
 
a) China-Singapore Joint Steering Council (JSC) 
At the national level, a joint steering committee known as the China-Singapore Joint Steering 
Council (JSC) was established, headed by both the deputy prime ministers of China and 
Singapore and assisted by other members consisting of high-level ministers from both countries. 
This JSC was to be the main political committee responsible for facilitating macro-level state 
policies and easing the implementation of the project. Having Singapore’s deputy prime minister 
and China’s Vice-premier leading the JSC was a deliberate decision so as to demonstrate the 
importance that both governments placed on the project and to convince investors of the 
viability of the project. This national support also boosted the competitive edge of the Suzhou 
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Industrial Park over the many other industrial zones in China. The JSC was to meet annually 
and make sure that overall performance targets were achieved at the lower working levels.  
 
The China-Singapore 
Joint Steering Committee (JSC) 
The China-Singapore 
Joint Working Committee (JWC) 
The Suzhou Industrial Park 
Administrative Committee 
(SIPAC) 
The China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park 




Pte Ltd (SSTD) 
65%
The China Suzhou 
Industrial Park Company 
Ltd. (CSIPC)  
35%
Figure 2.1 Initial Collaboration Flowchart and Structure of the SIP in 1994
 
b) China-Singapore Joint Working Committee (JWC) 
At the next level, the China-Singapore Joint Working Committee (JWC) was set up consisting 
of local Jiangsu, Suzhou and Singapore government officials responsible for looking into the 
direct challenges and issues facing the industrial park’s development. This JWC was then headed 
by the Suzhou Mayor and the Chairman of the Singapore Economic Development Board. The 
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c) The China-Singapore Suzhou Development Company (CSSD) 
The final and third level of cooperation consists of the Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative 
Committee (SIPAC) and the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development 
Corporation Ltd (CSSD). In essence, SIPAC and CSSD are parallel level organizations 
responsible for different aspects of the running the park. The CSSD was to be the incorporated 
company made up of the 65%-35% joint venture between the Singapore-led consortium, the 
Singapore-Suzhou Township Development Pte Ltd (SSTD), and the China-led consortium, The 
China Suzhou Industrial Park Company Ltd (CSIPC). The CSSD was the main marketing 
division of the Suzhou Industrial Park, and its internal departments were headed by 
Singaporeans to portray CSSD as being distinctively ‘Singaporean’ in character to make it easier 
in dealing with trans-national corporations who may still view Chinese management practices 
with suspicion.   
 
d) Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Committee (SIPAC)  
SIPAC its counterpart, was the main Chinese authority governing the park, including all 
administrative matters such as resources regulation, approval and licensing, as well as business 
services and coordination with related government departments or agencies at the various levels. 
It was also responsible for approving investment projects, planning and regulating the use of land, 
construction development, traffic flow as well as environmental protection. Unlike the CSSD, 
officials and employees of SIPAC were Chinese nationals, appointed by the Jiangsu Provincial 
Government, and recruited from amongst the most qualified of candidates in China. SIPAC was 
the main agency to undergo the Singapore government’s software transfer program. 
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Forming the Singapore Consortium to Take the Lead 
The collaboration for the SIP would take place at two levels. First at the state level, the Singapore 
government would transfer its development software to Suzhou and help Suzhou set up a 
development authority that would zone and regulate the township. ‘Development software’ refers 
to the set of management skills, policies and processes needed to set up and manage the township. 
The Singapore government would also send its bureaucrats to Suzhou to help out while regularly 
conducting training programs for Suzhou officials in Singapore. All expenses for these training 
programs would be borne by the Singapore government, a reflection of its efforts to cultivate 
good relationships with the Chinese Central Government.  At the second level, the collaboration 
would be a private-sector venture, aimed at establishing an industrial, commercial and residential 
modern township in Suzhou that will be run along Singapore lines. The Singapore Government 
stressed repeatedly that for the collaboration to be seen as successful, the joint-venture had to at 
the end of the day prove to be commercially viable. It was for this reason that the Singapore 
government let Keppel Corporation take over the leadership of the township project from the 
Singapore Labour Foundation International (SLF International) which had originally signed the 
in-principle agreement with the Suzhou government on behalf of the Singapore government in 
May 1993 (The Straits Times, 13 August 1993; Business Times, 13 August 1993).  
 
The initial composition and thinking behind the structure of the Singapore Consortium  aimed 
to provide a good balance of Government-led Companies (GLCs), private developers and 
companies of the labour movement. In line with the Singapore government’s intentions to have 
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the private sector lead this project, Keppel Corporation Limited (KCL) was asked to lead the 
Consortium which would be responsible for reviewing the commercial aspects of the Suzhou 
Township development with Mr Lim Chee On leading and representing the Consortium in its 
negotiations with the Suzhou government. It was felt that the private sector, with its keen 
understanding of investors’ commercial requirements and its wide international network of 
contacts, would be better placed to ensure the commercial success of the township development. 
 
From correspondence between the Singapore Government and the Suzhou Municipal 
Government, the Singapore Government continually reiterated to its Suzhou counterparts that 
their decision to select Suzhou for the proposed software transfer, comprising of management 
skills, strategies and know-how, would be influenced to a large extent by the decision of the 
Consortium and investors to invest there. The Suzhou Government was urged to look at the 
project with a macro and long-term view especially since the Singapore Government would incur 
considerable expenses in the course of its software transfer to China. The Singapore government 
clearly saw itself as being the bigger risk taker in the collaboration, viewing the financial risks of 
such a project for the Consortium immense while seeing the Suzhou Government as having little 
to lose. According to the respondents, the Singapore government felt that should the project fail, 
Suzhou would at least be left with improved infrastructure and a well-planned township. The 
Consortium’s investments would however go down the drain. If successful, the township would 
generate considerable tangible as well as less tangible social and commercial benefits for the 
Suzhou Muncipality and Jiangsu province in general. The success of the software transfer 
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program thus lay in how the Singapore Consortium viewed the collaboration and benefited from 
the on-going development. 
 
2.4 The Negotiation Process: Problems and Disagreements 
 
Interviews with former senior Singapore bureaucrats and Suzhou Municipal Government 
officials revealed that the negotiation process for the SIP was often marred by incidents of 
misunderstanding, uncertainty and disagreement and that the entire process was at times tedious 
and disheartening. Although all parties eventually came to a consensus on the collaboration 
structure, this was after a significant amount of deliberation and bargaining, and the resultant 
agreement was a highly compromised one. Amongst some of the major issues of contention 
between the parties involved investment considerations such as raw material costing, the nature 
of the collaboration and each party’s shareholding stake. Other problems surfaced as a result of 
differences in working attitudes and approaches, leading to unhappiness about Singapore’s 
apparent insensitivity as well as lack of respect for Chinese officials and the way things are done 
in China. 
 
A One-Sided Negotiation Process? 
 
The whole negotiation process comprised of lengthy dialogue and to-and-fro communication 
which lasted over a year before the final terms were agreed on by all parties. During the course of 
formation of any collaboration, it is natural that all parties involved would seek to maximize their 
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gains from the partnership, and the process of bargaining coupled with the final stipulated level 
of involvement and stakes negotiated are often good indications as to the level of commitment 
each party was willing to place on the collaboration as well as their attitudes toward the 
partnership and project. One would expect that both the Suzhou Municipal Government and 
the Singapore Government would strive to ensure that their views and interests were well 
represented in the final collaboration terms given the significance of being the first high level 
government-to-government collaboration in China. However, according to former senior 
Singapore bureaucrats who were part of the negotiation process and group, as well as former 
Suzhou Municipal Government leaders, the final proposal for the joint-collaboration and its 
term sheet was based primarily on the requirements and requests of the Singapore Government 
and Consortium. With the exception to some disagreements over land prices, the Suzhou 
government basically accepted the proposed term sheet in its entirety without much dispute, 
including the proposed the 65%-35% share ratio as structured by the Singapore Consortium. 
According to one of the respondents who were a key figure in the conception of the Suzhou 
Township development and the negotiation process, there was no clear rational behind the 
agreed share structure ratio except to clearly have the controlling stake and say within the 
partnership. 
 
“…That figure was thrown up for no reason. I mean if you ask me, it could be 60-40, 70-30, 
so we thought 65-35, 2 thirds around there was a good figure but that’s all. So if you’re 
asking rationale, I can’t think of any. If anything, we want the majority. We put the money 
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in, we want the majority. That’s all… Of course, 65% means we have to put in 65% of the 
money. If they had 65%, they would have to put in that amount of money.” 
(Interview, April 2007) 
 
For the Suzhou government, they too were agreeable to the proposed terms by the Singapore 
Consortium. The reason according to a former Chinese official was as given: 
 
“We said to them ‘With regards to the share structure, you want how much, you take how 
much’. Why? Because at that time, we were not just looking at it just from the economic 
perspective, but more importantly, was that once the Singapore side had the controlling stake, 
they could come manage (the project), they could bring the best of their talents to Suzhou, send 
them to the various departments within CSSD. All department heads would be from 
Singapore, would be delegated by them, so that the entire management concept and model 
could also flow through…if we were to take the 65% majority share, that would mean that 
we would have to run the project, and that would mean doing things the same Chinese way 
wouldn’t it? That is not what we wanted. We wanted to make this a success.” 
        (Interview, May 2007) 
 
Pushy, ‘Unreasonable’ Singapore? 
 
The Suzhou Municipal Government and all its officials involved in the negotiation process were 
apparently very accommodating toward the Singapore Consortium and Government and sought 
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to expedite the issue quickly by acceding to the latter’s requests as much as possible. However, 
the nature and conduct of the process itself was not all that smooth-sailing and during the long 
drawn out process of reaching the eventual agreed terms and conditions, there were already signs 
of mistrust, miscommunication and unhappiness over the alleged manner in which the 
Singapore Consortium was apparently dishing out orders and making  unreasonable demands. 
 
Interviews with former Singapore bureaucrats as well as correspondence between officials of the 
Suzhou Municipal Government to representatives of the Consortium reveal that there were a 
number of occasions whereby the Suzhou government was apparently unhappy with the conduct 
in which discussions were taking place and felt that their position and status as proposed joint-
venture partner were constantly being undermined. There were also disgruntlements that the 
Singapore side may have been taking the concessions given to them for granted. In particular, the 
Suzhou team was demoralized that the long process of negotiation, multiple discussion and 
meetings held failed consistently failed to yield any concrete working plan or official 
commitment from the Singapore Consortium. During the course of negotiation, several senior 
officials from the Suzhou government apparently expressed out of frustration that they wanted to 
quit from the project and cease all dialogue. The Suzhou government officials were said to have 
been extremely unhappy with the supposed pre-condition that the Singapore Consortium had  
apparently insisted on, viz. that the Singapore Consortium could pull out should the Singapore 
Government decide subsequently not to transfer its software to Suzhou, or if it chose to pull the 
plug on the transfer program midway. Members of the Singapore Consortium were apparently 
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adamant that this pre-condition be incorporated in the agreement to be signed or they would 
have second thoughts about proceeding with the township development.  
 
For the Suzhou Municipal Government, this pre-condition was seen as both insulting and a sign 
of lack of confidence in Suzhou and its leadership. To the Suzhou officials, the development of 
the industrial township was originally meant to be a separate issue from the software transfer 
program. If the Singapore Government chose Suzhou also to be the site for the software transfer 
program, this would be an added bonus to the proposed township development, but the 
Singapore Consortium should not seek to link the two projects together. The Suzhou team was 
demoralized by the responses they were getting from their Singapore Consortium, but they 
sought to keep an open dialogue while seeking understanding from their Singaporean 
counterparts. The Mayor of Suzhou apparently expressed that they had exceeded their limits of 
authority and had bent over backwards several times to accommodate the Singapore 
Consortium’s requests. Acceding to the pre-condition would get them into trouble with the 
Beijing Central Government and they felt that the Singapore team was being unduly 
unreasonable. There were even suggestions from the Chinese side that perhaps the Singapore 
Consortium was trying to squeeze concessions out of the Chinese government by ‘playing the 
Shandong card’ as Shandong at that point of time, was also keen on getting Singaporean 
expertise to help it develop. It seemed that the Suzhou Municipal Government felt as though 
they were being pressured to accede to the Singapore Consortium’s request or face losing out on 
this project to Shandong.  
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In addition to the issue of this pre-condition, the Suzhou Municipal Government was also 
apparently very unhappy that despite all the efforts put in by them in working out the details and 
mechanics of the collaboration, their Singapore counterparts insisted on just signing a 
‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MOU) rather than a more formal agreement.  The 
significance of signing an MOU versus a contractual agreement was twofold. First it indicated 
that the Singapore Consortium might not be confident about the project or about their 
prospective partners, and it was also telling of the level of commitment the Singapore 
Consortium would place on the project, as in most cases, an MOU would allow for an easier 
pull-out should the development not progress according to Singapore’s expectations. Suzhou 
officials pointed out that this was an apparent lack of sincerity on the Singapore side to establish 
good long terms relationship with the Suzhou Municipal Government. The Suzhou Municipal 
Government expressed to the Singapore side that for them, maintaining a positive and effective 
relationship was important. To the Suzhou Government, it seemed that the Singapore 
Consortium approached the collaboration simply from a dollar and cents approach but the 
Suzhou side warned that longer-term relations could be hurt by the way negotiations were 
conducted.  
 
The Singapore Consortium apparently ought to defend itself by arguing that in the course of 
such business negotiations, misunderstandings were bound to occur, especially when language 
posed a barrier to effective communication. For Singapore, the Suzhou officials’ complaints were 
simply a case of poor translation and not bad intentions on their part. However, correspondence 
between Singapore Consortium members reveal that the Singapore Consortium was extremely 
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cautious about working with the Chinese, and there were suspicions that the Suzhou Municipal 
Government’s professed unhappiness was just a tactic to exert pressure on them to seal the deal 
quickly minimizing the chance to consider other finer details to the collaboration.  As a result, 
the Singapore Consortium sought to delay the signing of the MOU until they were suitably 
comfortable with the terms discussed. They did however extend the olive branch by assuring 
their Suzhou counterparts that Singapore was also determined for the cooperation to be long 
term. Their explanation for the lengthy negotiation process was that because Keppel Corporation 
was taking the lead in the collaboration, it was laying its credibility on the line by inviting other 
companies to join the Consortium and it was hence necessary for them to be more cautious. The 
other issue that the Singapore Consortium was concerned about during the negotiation process 
was to maintain its independence from the Singapore Government. Already, it seemed that to 
their Chinese counterparts,  many of the Consortium members were government run or 
‘controlled’ companies, and that this may undermine the negotiation power of the Singapore 
Consortium especially if their Suzhou counterparts saw them merely as ‘puppets’ who could not 




The other issue of contention between the Singapore Consortium and Suzhou Government was 
that of land prices. At that time, there were regularly unfavourable reports on the problems of 
bribery in China and the squeeze on existing joint ventures as the Central Government applied 
the brakes to the economy only seemed to aggravate the situation (Asian Wall Street Journal 2 & 
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4 August 1993; Straits Times 29 July 1993; Business Times 20 July & 4 August 93). Given the 
negative publicity on investments in China then, the Singapore Consortium was concerned 
about its financial exposure in such a large project. For this reason, a key issue was the land price, 
which the Consortium felt had to be attractive enough to give the Consortium a reasonable 
return on investments commensurate with the financial crisis. However, the land issue was far 
more complex. From the interviews, it was learned that the Suzhou Municipal Government did 
seek to offer the best raw land prices for the Singapore Government, but they were constrained 
by new policies and directives issued by the Central Government nationwide.   
 
To acquire the land required for the Township development, resettlement of farmers and 
villagers in the vicinity was necessary. The new reform direction meant that the local Suzhou 
government had to ensure that the farmers and villagers were compensated adequately and fairly 
according the Central guidelines, so the final land price reached had to factor issues such as the 
type of agricultural crops and produce grown on the land and the value of the land to the 
villagers. Significant amount of time was spent on negotiating the land cost and values as 
individual stakeholders sought to ensure that their interests were represented and that they were 
not being short-changed in any way. Eventually after repeated rounds of discussion and 
negotiation, a formula for the land price was subsequently reached for the first phase of 
development with the understanding that the Suzhou Municipal Government would exercise 
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Co-operative or Equity Joint-Venture? 
 
A major issue that delayed the process of signing the MOU was differences between the Suzhou 
Municipal Government and the Singapore Consortium over the form that the joint-venture 
would take between the two parties. Based on interviews and correspondence between the 
Singapore Consortium and the Suzhou Municipal Government, the former was firmly in favour 
of forming a Co-operative Joint-Venture (CJV), while the latter was only willing to consider an 
Equity Joint-Venture (EJV). There are certain important key differences between these two 
forms of joint-ventures and these differences are telling about how each party viewed the other, 
the concerns they had going into the partnership as well as their assessment of their risk exposure 
from the project. 
 
According to correspondence between Singapore Consortium members, the Singapore 
Consortium wanted to form a CJV rather than an EJV because it would side-step issues over raw 
land prices and resettlement costs, and expedite negotiations in their favour quickly. Their plan 
was for all revenue generated from leasing prepared land or factories/offices to be used to repay 
all loans and operating expenses first. The remaining surplus, if any, would be shared between 
the CJV partners using a mutually agreed formula. The main reason for proposing a CJV 
structure was because development of the township was mainly infrastructural in nature, and cost 
recovery for such projects usually takes a long time. Profits would be very low initially but as the 
township developed, the Consortium believed that investors and end-users would be more wiling 
to pay a high premium, resulting in an increase in operational costs, but also revenue and profits. 
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The Consortium believed that the CJV would benefit both parties as they could reap the 
increased benefits without being affected by the need to raise additional funds to meet increased 
operating costs.  
 
That the Singapore Consortium advocated a CJV structure showed perhaps foresight, but more 
importantly, the ambivalence it had towards the project. The most significant difference between 
an EJV and a CJV is that in a CJV, the CJV parties’ profit, control and risks are divided 
according to negotiated contract terms and not simply based on the shareholding ratio. Clearly, 
the Singapore Consortium wanted to spread its risks and minimize any unnecessary exposure by 
ensuring that the Suzhou Government would participate actively in the project and shoulder the 
appropriate amount of risks themselves rather than distribute risks according to equity shares, 
which would put the Singapore Consortium as the major shareholder in an unfavourable 
situation. There were also other reasons why the Singapore Consortium preferred to form a CJV: 
i. First, as a CJV partner in China, the Singapore Consortium would be able to go 
through their Chinese partners to ‘borrow’ assets and licenses that would otherwise 
be forbidden to foreign investors under Chinese law. By doing so, the Singapore 
Consortium would likely be able to possess valuable assets such as land without 
having to pay high taxes for foreign ownership.  
ii. Second, the Singapore Consortium would be assured of some form of returns on its 
investment costs, as by being a CJV partner, it could ‘safely’ invest in costly 
technology and equipment first, but have the CJV repay this sum in advanced from 
revenues before profit sharing. This move could be used in sectors where the Chinese 
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law caps foreign ownership and when the Chinese partner cannot afford to fund 
assets up front. This would give the Consortium a chance to enter sensitive but 
profitable sectors not open to foreign ownership.  
iii. Importantly, a CJV also in theory allows for more foreign control. This would allow 
the Consortium to negotiate levels of management and financial control, as well as 
methods of recourse associated with equipment leases and service contracts. An EJV 
does not allow for such flexibility however, and the Consortium would not always be 
able to obtain the level of control it may want since EJVs typically rely on equity 
levels to assign board seats and other rights. 
iv. The CJV structure also tends to force the partners to address rights and 
responsibilities in advanced since the Central government must approve all CJV 
investments to determine that the venture is allowed to legally engage in the 
specified business scope. This added level of scrutiny would give the Singapore 
Consortium more measures to deal with non-compliance and give the Consortium 
better recourse than an EJV contract if the Suzhou Government failed to comply to 
the terms and conditions stipulated in the contract. 
v. Given the uncertainty of the project, minimal experience in a project of such nature 
and the changing macroeconomic situation in China, a CJV would give more leeway 
for the Consortium to terminate the venture or modify the terms than in an EJV, 
particularly if the CJV partners held assets separately (Harrigan 1988). In projects 
where the risk of failure in the development phase was high, as in the case of the 
proposed Suzhou Township development, a CJV contract would be useful since it 
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could be modified without terminating a partnership and forgoing investments and 
goodwill. 
The Suzhou Municipal Government however preferred to form an EJV, and it conveyed to the 
Singapore Government during the early days of negotiation that the Central Government would 
only consider the collaboration if there was equity involved. EJV was the preferred mode of 
collaboration especially with foreign parties at that time for the Chinese Central Government 
(Beamish, 1993). Suzhou leaders apparently highlighted to the Singapore Consortium that the 
proposal submitted to and approved by the Central Government was on the basis that an EJV 
would be formed to effect the investment as agreed during the In-Principle Agreement signed 
between the Suzhou Municipal Government and the Singapore Labour Foundation in May 
1993. It would be difficult and impractical for the Singapore Consortium to ask the Suzhou 
Municipal Government to amend the form and terms of the joint-venture. Also, the Suzhou 
government felt that as the development of the township was intended to be a long-term project, 
it would be more meaningful to set up an EJV than a CJV since it would force partners to work 
closer together and there would be mutual sharing of profits and losses. To further support their 
case for an EJV, the Suzhou Municipal Government explained that under the laws of the 
People’s Republic of China, the assets of a CJV would belong to the Chinese party at the end of 
the CJV, but there was no such stipulation for an EJV. Hence it would also be beneficial to the 
Singapore Consortium to form an EJV since an EJV may be liquidated at the end of the joint-
venture and the assets would be shared in proportion with the equities of the respective joint-
venture partners even if the joint-venture ended up to be not profitable.   
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Still, it was not a simple case of the Suzhou Municipal Government wanting to ensure a ‘fair’ 
deal for the Singapore Consortium that the Suzhou Municipal and Central Governments 
preferred an EJV structure. The primary goal as far as the Chinese parties are concerned when it 
came to joint ventures was to exploit their market knowledge, preferential market treatment, and 
manufacturing capability along with the technology, manufacturing know-how, and marketing 
experience of the foreign partners for quicker results as the Chinese economy opens up (Pan 
1996). Because in an EJV, profit and risk sharing are proportionate to the equity of each partner 
in the joint venture, by being the minor shareholder in the venture, the Suzhou Government 
could control the amount of capital investment, risks and commitment that it would be exposed 
to during the project development. In this sense, it was a strategic calculated move on the Suzhou 
Municipal Government’s side to adopt the EJV format over a CJV. The Singapore Consortium 
had little choice but to accept the EJV structure if they wished to proceed with the collaboration. 
The amount of emphasis and time spent by both parties on the type of joint-venture they were 
going to form was telling about the level of confidence and commitment that both parties felt 
towards the proposed township development. While the Suzhou Municipal Government was 
enthusiastic about the potential benefits it could reap from the collaboration, it was not as 
willing to bear the main responsibility of managing or financing the project. For the Singapore 
Consortium, they were unfamiliar with the investment environment and related policies in 
China, and were thus very concerned about exit point options and strategies given numerous 
examples whereby other earlier international joint ventures had encountered problems in China 
before (Oded, 1990). 
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The eventual result of Singapore ‘failing’ to secure a CJV arrangement is significant as it may 
reflect a fundament asymmetry in this partnership from day one.  It would have seemed that 
given Singapore’s astute investment track record, it would have resisted what appeared to be a 
less-than-average deal given that CJV was the dominant form of FDI in the 1990s unless the 
Singapore Government was expecting to reap other benefits from this arrangement. In response 
to the question of why it seemed that the Singapore Government conceded ‘defeat’ to the 
Suzhou Municipal Government’s bargaining, most of the Singaporean respondents believed that 
the Singapore Government’s primary national interest was for the SIP to be a ‘show-case’ project 
and carry the Singapore brand name over to China to create national level exposure and 
opportunities to other Singaporean companies looking to get a foothold in the Chinese market.  
One of the respondents did however provide a more insightful reason as to why the Singapore 
Government may have accepted the arrangement was that because the investment risks and costs 
were primarily funded by the Consortium members and not directly by the Singapore 
Government.  According to this respondent: 
“All the money came from the Consortium… (but) they knew (and were prepared) to be in 
for the long term (to be profitable).” 
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CHAPTER 3: THE SOFTWARE TRANSFERENCE  
PROGRAM --- THE ONE BRIGHT SPARK IN THE PROJECT? 
 
Chapter 3 analyzes in detail the software transference program between the Singapore and 
Suzhou governments. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical examination of the 
software transference process and why this aspect of the SIP collaboration has been a success 
whereas progress in other areas has been less positive. It focuses on the process of transference 
and the mechanics of communication, how these have contributed to an effective transfer of 
knowledge and how the Chinese have adapted Singaporean practices into a system of their own, 
modeled uniquely to suit their local government needs and requirements.   
 
3.1 China’s Economic Reform and the Need for Knowledge and Management 
Development 
 
As China embarked on a steep process of macroeconomic reforms starting as early as December 
1978 during the Third Plenum of the 11th Chinese Communist Party Congress, some of the 
most pressing issues to address included the training and developing of a workforce that was 
capable of matching international management standards and caliber. The purpose for setting 
these goals was so that it could increase its own domestic pool of managerial staff in both the 
public and private sectors to meet the vigorous management standards of foreign companies and 
governments. This was crucial for China to have a seamless integration into the international 
financial and economic system.   
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The reform period witnessed a fundamental shift in the structuring of China’s organizational and 
business systems. Moving away from the wholly centralized government to a system that gave 
greater authority and responsibility to local governments, enterprises and production units to set 
and achieve performance targets, this new policy direction was in part motivated by a shortage of 
adaptable and trained managerial personnel skilled in the understanding and functioning of a 
market economy within the Central government and the existing Chinese workforce. Realizing 
that new and more sophisticated management skills and technologically skilled labor and human 
capital were critical for the sustainability and advancement of an economy, the Central 
Government began to give priority to management training in the workforce. 
 
In the 1980s, China began to quickly embrace new and foreign management training programs. 
To further boost sentiments and support for the reform process, the Central government also 
introduced a series of legislations to strengthen acceptance and adherence in this respect and in 
1984, a document relevant to China’s economic reform was passed, in which it emphasized 
greater commitment towards the improvement of management training and development.  The 
reform movement also benefited from the influx of international training programs organized by 
global organizations such as the United Nations and the setting up of a number of professional 
associations such as the Chinese Enterprise Management Association and the China-European 
Community Management Institute which helped create awareness and advice on managerial 
training requirements and guidelines (Branine, 1996) 
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As foreign investment and multi-lateral trade began to grow in China, it became all the more 
apparent that there was a serious need for management education and large-scale knowledge 
transfer amongst personnel at all managerial levels in order to develop and implement new 
policies that would be suitable for a market-led economy. This was more critical in the foreign 
investment and trade sector due to the nature of increasingly liberalized arrangements for 
international trade. Existing managerial personnel had been largely trained in skills relevant only 
to the socialist central planning economy model, and it was crucial for China to improve the 
quality of management particularly in areas of finance and accounting accountability, marketing 
and human resource management so as to have the necessary ability to implement market-led 
economic policies in the future.  
 
However no clear framework was set. Indeed, while the Central Government issued directives to 
embark on learning the management knowledge and skills of the West, there were no 
instructions as how to acquire these skills while not contradicting the principles of the Chinese 
Government’s essentially socialist theories. Although the government linked work performance 
evaluation to acquisition of advanced management skills, most calls for such training and 
development were phrased vaguely, just like the following report made by then premier Zhao 
Ziyang to the Second Session of the 6th National People’s Congress in May 1984: 
 
“Cadres engaged in economic work [had to]…learn economic management and modern 
science and technology. The records of their studies should be made an important criterion for 
appraising their work and for promotion in wage grade…To obtain practical results the 
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content and requirements of such training should vary with the posts and the ages of employees. 
From now on, in recruiting workers and staff members, the enterprises must provide pre-job 
training for candidates and enlist those who have done well in examination.” 
 
Further complicating things was the Central government’s position towards learning from the 
West. On one hand, they were keen to acquire the expertise knowledge of their Western 
counterparts, but on the other hand, they were wary that this would lead to corruption by 
Western values and ideologies.  This ambiguous stance and the possible consequences stemming 
from this was best demonstrated by how personnel sent to the UK and Canada for management 
training were sent to ‘re-education centres’ to study the Chinese communist ideology on their 
return to China in the early 1990s (Branine 1996). The Chinese Government acknowledged that 
the management knowledge of Western capitalist societies could be used to change and improve 
the management structure and style, but its modernization did not imply that China would also 
become ‘Westernized’. 
 
3.2 Knowledge and Technology Transfer: Approaches and Issues 
 
Knowledge and technology transfer has long been one of the many ways in which firms in 
developing countries gain access to organizational knowledge and processes used by firms in 
developed countries (Marcotte and Niosi, 2000).  The process of knowledge transfer, sharing and 
acquisition has also been more recently utilized at the governmental and institutional levels to 
facilitate economic advancement and to increase international competitiveness. In theory, 
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governments and firms from developing countries such as China seek to form cooperation and 
training programs with counterparts from developed countries like Singapore to try to learn 
relevant new skills to quickly catch up with their international competitors. The results on the 
effectiveness of such technology transfer varies with some governments and institutions seeming 
to learn fairly quickly and put into effective practice the skills acquired during the transfer period, 
while others seem not to be as successful (Freeman and Hagedoorn, 1994; David, 1997). The 
most successful governments or firms are those that do not just merely learn and replicate 
processes, but adapt and change these to effectively reflect and address problems within their 
respective political, social, economic systems and national context. 
 
3.3 Exploring the Singapore Experience 
 
As China opened up its market and sped up economic reforms, two significant changes led to the 
official and explicit call by the Central Government for the transfer of management knowledge 
and skills from Western countries. First, international trade and foreign investment surged ahead 
and numerous joint ventures and the establishment of a large number of new foreign trading 
companies helped to enhance the reforms into the international market. Second, the Chinese 
Government began to accept private ownership, which was an important concession given the 
socialist governance of the country. 1992 proved to be a pivotal point in the reform movement 
for improved management methods. It saw a renewed attempt to encourage the adoption of 
Western management methods.  
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It was around this period that the subject of ‘software transference’ was conceptualized between 
the Singapore government and the local Suzhou government. The idea was for the Singapore 
government with its solid track record in developing top notch industrial parks and world class 
management standards of operation and human resource management, to impart its knowledge 
and experience in these areas to the Suzhou government.  According to a number of the Chinese 
respondents interviewed, the Chinese Government felt that the Singapore model of development 
and management was representative of efficiency, reliability, transparency and importantly, a 
seeming ‘unity’ and solidarity in policy making and implementation at all levels: qualities which 
the Western developed nations and corporations were drawn to. In line with the economic 
reform movement in China, the Suzhou government was hopeful that such a transfer would 
provide the much needed impetus and opportunity for its residents and workers to acquire 
modern Westernized management skills and practices, fast tracking Suzhou’s overall 
infrastructure development and economic growth, thus giving Suzhou the competitive edge over 
other counties and municipalities in terms of attracting foreign investors and raising its profile 
both at the national and international level.  In the words of a Singaporean bureaucrat who was 
part of the exploratory dialogue process in its infant stage, the Suzhou leaders were keen to “leave 
their mark in history.”  The expectations for this transference program were high even at the 
initial stages of discussion, with plans for the collaboration model, both its hardware component 
and the software aspect, to be replicated in other parts of China if proven to be successful in 
raising the standards of management style and infrastructure development to world class 
standards in Suzhou. 
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Adopting and learning the Singaporean way of management was more appealing and in many 
ways, a more functional and acceptable choice for the local Suzhou Municipal Government and 
then subsequently for the Chinese Central Government as well. While the green light had been 
given by the Central government to proceed with experimenting with Western style business and 
management practices, there was still an air of caution and uncertainty as to which country’s 
model could be effectively adopted in China and yet not contradict the socialist principles 
governing China’s political system and society. Singapore with its soft-authoritarian structure 
and a governing polity that was effectively in control of its citizens, had been criticized in the 
Western media for its limited democratic reforms and its interpretation democracy that went 
against the conventional norms of Western ideals and practices. However, the Singapore 
Government had still managed to transform back-water island with no natural resources into one 
of the most important and advanced financial centers in the region, with international business 
standards and a highly educated and mobile workforce. It has thus drawn rave reviews and 
admiration from both critiques and supporters alike. These above reasons, coupled with Deng 
Xiaoping’s personal admiration for the Singaporean economic growth model, put any fears of 
overly idolizing the West to ease for both local and Central Chinese governments. 
 
Another reason why the Chinese was keen to work with Singapore, was that it believed that a 
Singaporean approach to investment and industrial development would attract transnational 
investors from outside Asia better than how the other economic zones in China did at that point 
in time. Primarily, the Chinese government felt that investors were more familiar with 
Singapore’s style of management and business methods than traditional Chinese business 
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methods, and hence the Singapore brand name could attract those investors who were hesitating 
to invest in China.  
 
There were two levels of learning that the Suzhou government was keen to pursue with 
Singapore. The first consisted of hardware and urban planning expertise skills. This was to be 
centered on the Singapore’s infrastructure blueprint, in particular the Jurong Town Corporation 
(JTC) model which changed the industrial and investment landscape of Singapore by providing 
advanced and specialized ready-built business and industrial facilities and spaces allowing foreign 
investors to set up operations in Singapore in a very short period of time. By providing excellent 
business services and logistical assistance such as reducing significantly the application time for 
land, premises, lease approval and endorsement of plans, JTC has helped make Singapore a 
choice investment location in the region for foreign investors. These JTC initiatives have been 
largely credited with significantly drawing new and sustainable foreign investors and operations 
into Singapore and the Suzhou government was hoping that they too could develop an 
investment environment of international standards whereby its investors could grow and become 
more competitive.  
 
The second level of learning, which this chapter focuses on, involves Singapore’s software 
capabilities. Software here refers to the business and administration methods utilized by the 
Singapore government and organizations, and encompasses the more abstract but equally 
important area of management knowledge transfer and policy making processes which are tacit 
in nature. The Singapore government having achieved international recognition for its principals 
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of meritocracy, efficiency and anti-corruption measures, as well as the rapidness in which it 
transformed Singapore into a regional financial powerhouse based on its unique set of economic 
and urban planning blueprints distinct from the traditional Western models, was an attractive 
example by which the socialist Chinese government could learn from.  In particular, the 
Singapore experience demonstrated to the Chinese that any shortfalls or critiques that foreign 
investors have towards the host country’s political system could be countered and addressed by 
providing a competitive and effective business and investment environment for foreign 
investment. The focus for the Chinese was thus on adopting, adapting and putting into practice 
the Singapore experience in terms of governance both at the private and public sector into 
Suzhou to improve productivity, efficiency and transparency. 
 
The direct benefits to the Chinese from such collaboration explain their eagerness towards the 
project. However, the rewards to the Singapore Government were not as tangible. In a typical 
corporate context, most management skills and processes are safeguarded carefully as they are 
potentially an important strategic resource against competition (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). It 
was thus unusual that the Singapore Government was so keen to transfer their know-how and 
managerial experience and culture to the Chinese without expecting any form of ‘payment’ for 
accepting this ‘lop-sided’ arrangement. According to some of the Singaporean respondents, the 
Singapore Government and its leaders viewed the SIP project as necessary and important at the 
national level because it could serve as a conduit for Sino-Singapore political relations. More 
importantly, it was seen as a platform by which Singapore’s new generation of leaders could 
regular meet and dialogue with their Chinese counterparts to facilitate greater economic 
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cooperation, opportunities and understanding about the Chinese culture and business system.  It 
was seen as a ‘fast-track’ program to allow Singapore to play catch up with other foreign investors 
who had jumped on to the China boat much earlier such as investors from Japan, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. Interestingly enough, the question of the applicability of the Singaporean model to 
Suzhou long term did not seem to surface throughout the entire negotiation process. This is 
telling, for it may point out a politicized blind-spot in Singapore’s outward investment that was 
to surface later in the form of collaborative problems and hiccups during the transition period.  
 
3.4 The Software Transference Program: Mechanics of Transference  
 
In tandem with the setting up of the CSSD, the Singapore Software Project Office (SSPO) was 
officially established in Suzhou in 1993 to be run and administered by the Singapore Economic 
Development Board (SEDB). The number of participating Singaporean agencies and ministries 
on board the project was significant, and consisted of important government bodies such as the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI), the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA), the 
Ministry of National Development (MND), the Housing Development Board (HDB) and the 
Central Provident Fund Board (CPFB). 
 
There are several reasons why the software transfer program has been fairly successful. The first 
reason relates to the experience and capability of the information processing agents engaged in 
the software transfer process, namely the key Chinese officials and employees in the Singapore-
Suzhou Industrial Park, and how hiring quality and experienced candidates impacts the ability to 
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absorb new country-specific information from Singapore and translate it successfully into new 
knowledge applicable in Suzhou. The second is centered on the impact of communication on the 
ability to transfer and diffuse knowledge effectively across borders. It is assumed that frequent 
and intensive communication between the teaching and recipient country or firm will allow tacit 
information to be transferred more effectively (Allen and Lafollette 1977; Krackhardt 1992; 
Nonaka 1994). The last factor identified is related to how firms absorb tacit knowledge and then 
transform it to more value-added propositions suitable for their unique context and purpose. 
This transformation process is often an indication that recipient firms have understood 
sufficiently and mastered the information passed on to them, analyzed this knowledge, and then 
adapt former firm or country specific knowledge and processes into knowledge that they can use 
effectively within their own context. This research identifies the following as the key reasons why 
the Singapore-Suzhou software transference program is considered a success: 
  
i. The Singapore-Suzhou Software Transference Project has been successful because the Chinese 
government recruits qualified personnel with relevant work experience, prior overseas 
experience, and substantial training which enhance the success of the Suzhou government in 
absorbing transnational tacit management know-how from the Singapore government. 
 
ii. The Singapore-Suzhou Software Transference Project has been a success because the  high level 
of frequency and intensity of communication between the Suzhou officials and members of the 
Singapore government enhancs the ability of the Suzhou officials to effectively absorb and 
utilize the knowledge transferred to them by the Singapore government.  
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iii. The Singapore-Suzhou Software Transference Project has been a success because the Suzhou 
government has adapted and transformed Singaporean management policies into policies of 
their own.  
 
a) Skills and Work Experience of Agents: Personnel selection and training 
The mechanisms involved in transferring tacit knowledge is an extremely important factor 
affecting the success of the knowledge, or in this case specifically, the software transfer program. 
As such, the employees and agents employed by both the Chinese government and those sent by 
the Singapore government to train their Chinese counterparts, are integral pieces in this joint 
venture collaboration. It is argued that tacit knowledge and information are more effectively 
processed and registered, and yield greater potential, if the agents processing this knowledge have 
had some prior experience in the related fields, or have certain basic qualities such as educational 
background and former work training and so forth. Such experience provides agents with a 
greater ability to effectively absorb a new country’s information and apply it and in many 
instances, adapt it to create new knowledge that is beneficial to their own firm or organization 
(Bower and Hilgard 1981; Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  Relevant prior knowledge about the 
overseas country in which the knowledge originates from also helps agents to better absorb 
related new knowledge about those markets.  
 
For the Singapore-Suzhou Software Transfer Program, emphasis was placed on the quality and 
caliber of the employees recruited and trained for the management of the new industrial park. 
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Departing from the norm of recruiting based on the xiangqu (district) system whereby 
individuals could only work in the city or province that he or she resided in, the Chinese 
government embarked on a nation-wide search for the most talented and suitable candidates to 
work for and in the management of the Suzhou-Singapore Industrial Park. This new approach 
was influenced by the Singapore model based on meritocracy whereby employees were recruited 
based on their abilities regardless of other factors, and career advancement was to be based on 
performance and target achievement.  
 
Criteria for recruitment included educational background as well as work experience. In 
consultation with the Singapore side, it was decided and agreed that candidates hired into the 
SIP had to be from the better universities in China. By definition, ‘better universities’ correspond 
to the list of the top 36 comprehensive universities in China as ranked by the China Ministry of 
Education annually. This in itself is not an absolute criterion, but a candidate’s education 
background is a foremost consideration. Educational level such as having obtained a Bachelor’s 
degree or Master’s degree and above was also a factor for assessment. Work experience was 
another important factor and most candidates would have to have a couple years of real work 
experience upon graduation in relevant industries to be considered for hiring. For the early years 
of the SIP, emphasis was placed on recruiting individuals who had real work experience in urban 
planning or the construction industry because the SIP was then in need of employees in this area 
and were looking for people who could contribute to the growth of these industries.  
The process of recruitment was very rigorous, similar to the recruitment process of MNCs. All 
candidates had to pass a series of examinations before they could be considered for employment 
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at the SIP. Candidates were tested based on their particular area of studies or in the areas in 
which they were applying to. Successful candidates then had to sit an examination to test their 
English proficiency followed by psychological and personality testing to ensure that they will fit 
into the work culture and environment of the SIP. This was to ensure that the individuals 
employed would be able to work alongside one another effectively. After candidates passed all the 
written examinations, they were then subjected to interviews. For the earliest batch of interviews 
conducted, the Singapore government sent specialists to participate in the process. There would 
be one interviewer each from Singapore and Suzhou during each interview, and while Singapore 
would initially take the lead in interviewing the candidates, the Suzhou side soon became familiar 
with the process of interviewing including what kind of questions to ask and how to assess each 
individual candidate. The final decision on whether to hire was reached consultatively. 
According to sources, even the leader for the SIPAC was hired this way. Hence it could be seen 
that the recruitment exercise was taken very seriously by both the Singapore and Suzhou 
governments.  
 
When asked the purpose in pouring so much resources and effort into the strict recruitment 
procedures and criteria, a former Chinese official closely involved in the software transfer 
program and recruitment process explained: 
 
“The reason for this recruitment process is that we hope for every 100 candidates we see, we 
would be able to find 10 talented individuals…because we believe that they will be better 
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able to absorb the Singaporean model of management, to be better able to understand some of 
the international situations and practices.” 
        (Interview, July 2007) 
 
b) Immersion and Frequent Communication: Partner-to-Partner Interaction 
Through the interviews conducted, it was learned that there has always been a high level and 
frequency in interaction between the Singapore and Suzhou governments in the software 
transference program. There was no discrimination in terms of which individuals from Suzhou 
were selected to go to Singapore for training. All SIP staff was required to take turns to attend 
regular training sessions in Singapore. The earliest batch of trainees that the Suzhou government 
sent to Singapore consisted of ten individuals focused on learning about urban planning and 
construction. This particular training session was especially intensive due to the fact that the SIP 
was then in its infancy stage and it was critical that the individuals and management responsible 
for developing the infrastructure for the park would be adequately trained and taught in time. 
Hence, these ten individuals underwent a special three month intensive training program. 
Subsequent training programs generally last between two to three weeks, with some of the longer 
ones lasting over one month. Training is conducted regularly throughout the year, and in some 
years, there would be as many as ten sessions, one almost every month.  
 
To immerse participants further into the work culture and environment that is unique to 
Singapore, literally all training programs are held in Singapore. When the trainees are in 
Singapore, they are looked after by Singapore’s SPO. The three to four working personnel within 
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the Singapore SPO would be responsible for planning and the liaising with the various Singapore 
government organizations or companies to arrange necessary visits and tours.  The educational 
visits were very comprehensive and participants had to adhere to a very tight schedule, visiting at 
times up to three organizations in one day.  These visits included not just government 
institutions but also local private Singaporean companies to enable participants to have a whole-
rounded view of how Singaporean businesses are run. Only in two instances to date, have 
training programs been held in Suzhou. The most significant of this was that in 1995, when led 
by Lim Chee On, Singapore sent over a group of high-level specialists from Singapore to talk 
about what the Chinese term as ‘big software’ (daruanjian, ‘大软件’). This was a comprehensive 
program imparting the core components of Singapore’s software skills and expertise. Because of 
the significance attached to this particular training course, those that participated from the 
Suzhou side also comprised of the highest ranked government officials from Suzhou, including 
the Mayor himself.  
 
Dialogue between the Suzhou and Singapore governments started even before the software 
program officially started. When it was first decided that they would proceed with the software 
transfer, both governments jointly settled on a broad agreement, under which there were two 
separate sets of side agreements. The first was between the Suzhou local government and the 
Singapore government concerning business management. The second was signed between the 
Suzhou government and JTC to transfer the Singapore experience with regards to Industrial 
Township planning. Both these agreements focused on three areas of learning and knowledge 
transfer: urban planning and environment; economic development and; public administration, 
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including clean governance and setting up of legal frameworks and so forth. Under these three 
areas, a further list comprising of twenty-eight sub-topics was developed. This was a very detailed 
list of issues and every year, SIPAC would base its planning and development of the park based 
on the outline of these twenty-eight sub-topics. If for example, SIPAC decided that for the 
coming year, its focus would be on the sub-topic of environment, it would then liaise with its 
Singaporean counterparts or agencies in this area and let them know in advanced that it needed 
to learn a certain set of skills and policies soon. According to officials interviewed, coordination 
and communication between the respective parties were always very well organized.  
 
Because management skills are in many instances firm, country or even cultural specific, and not 
easy to be learnt by a third party simply by reading and going through textbooks, manuals and 
guidelines, the process of transferring different sets of Singaporean knowledge to the Suzhou 
government and SIPAC officials relied heavily on frequent face-to-face interaction between 
agents at all levels, and also on acquiring personal experience to ensure that the Chinese are able 
to successfully understand and harness the information that their Singaporean counterparts are 
trying to transmit. To enhance classroom interaction and foster a spirit of active discussion, all 
class sizes were kept between ten to twenty participants and led by one to two instructors each 
time. Although most of the SIPAC employees and Suzhou government officials were proficient 
in English, most of the classes were still primarily taught in Mandarin to minimize language 
miscommunication. Even when the trainees went to various organizations or institutions for 
visits, introductions and summaries would also be given in Mandarin. In particular instances 
however, when the Singaporean instructors were not fluent in Mandarin, such as instructors of 
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Indian ethnicity at the Singapore IT Institution, classes would be taught in English but with 
Mandarin translation on the side.  
 
In recognition that regular textbooks would have limited usefulness for knowledge transfer of this 
nature, participants were not given any form of books or manuals. Instead, the Chinese 
participants were taught in a more interactive manner. According to a former Chinese official: 
 
“No, there were no books or manuals. We only had the basic outline given to us in notes, and then 
OHP transparencies with basic points were shown to us. So after each lecture, we would conduct 
discussions amongst ourselves and after the discussion, we would then submit a report (to 
demonstrate that we have understood). Whatever experience we got was through interaction and 
dialogue…There were no real courses…but through observations and interactions, we learnt and 
familiarized with the Singapore model…It was really about us getting ‘in-sync’ with how 
Singapore works..” 
         (Interview, May 2007) 
 
Rigorous exercises including role playing exercises and analytical projects were also used to assess 
participants’ analytical abilities and test whether they have absorbed the knowledge that had been 
imparted to them during lessons. Through interviews with former Singapore officials, it was 
learnt that the Chinese trainees were extremely hardworking and were driven to learn as much as 
they could about the Singapore system of management and public governance, with many 
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putting in extremely long hours just to complete their assignments early and often ‘did their 
homework up to 2-3 am in the morning’. 
 
According to former and present Suzhou government officials interviewed, the Singaporean 
agencies and individuals who were involved in the teaching and transference process were just as 
committed and enthusiastic to the software transfer program. Not only were they encouraging 
during the training programs, but they were also pro-active in following up with their Chinese 
trainees outside of lessons, providing support as and when necessary. Hence whenever the SIPAC 
officials were unclear about how to proceed with implementing of certain policies and programs 
at the SIP, they were able to quickly contact their Singaporean counterparts and get relevant 
pointers and advice in executing certain policies. Singapore’s commitment to the software 
transfer program was also evident in the setting up of an EDB office within Suzhou to provide 
assistance to the SIP particularly during the early teething period. There were also many 
Singaporeans within CSSD which also enabled SIPAC officials to reach out to them for almost 
instant advice and clarification when required and this helped to lessen any ambiguity that the 
Chinese officials had in terms of comprehending the knowledge transmitted on to them by the 
Singapore side. The frequency in communication between Singapore and Suzhou officials at the 
SIP is evident, with one a former Singaporean manager at the SIP commenting: 
“There were constant meetings. Every week there would be meetings and discussions on how to 
take the project forward and stuff like that…They try to understand us and we try to 
understand them.” 
        (Interview, May 2007) 
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3.5 Evaluation: Why the Software Transfer Program Worked? 
 
A common problem associated with knowledge transfer across countries and organizations is that 
of culture and belief differences impeding the transfer of knowledge by the originating country to 
the recipient country. However, for the Singapore Suzhou Software Transfer Program, it was 
learnt that both sides adopted a very pragmatic and professional approach in dealing with any of 
such differences if and when they surfaced. What stood out was the level of tacit understanding 
and sensitivity between both sides towards each others working styles. According to the former 
Singaporean senior manager at the SIP, there was initial resistance from the Suzhou officials at 
the start of the software program and it took about a year for it to take off in terms of 
implementation because of middle level resistance and lack of understanding of the issues, but 
subsequently, working relations between the Chinese and Singapore side at SIPAC and CSSD 
between middle, middle-lower working administrators as well as the senior executive level were 
good, saying: 
 
“No, we didn’t have a problem at all. Of course there would be (initially) different working 
styles. We work differently because we come from different cultures, but not because of that 
that we get into quarrels. I mean we may debate on issues and stuff, but at the end of the day, 
we would come together to find a common solution together. It is not like we are ‘Ang Mohs’ 
(Caucasians) and they are Chinese, we do things our way and then they do it their way. At 
the working level, that was definitely not the case. Our working style is of course very different. 
We (Singapore) want everything documented, very proper and transparent, but for them it is 
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a lot of talking. But that doesn’t stop us from working together. We know they are like that so 
we work with it. We send all our minutes to them, and if they do not respond, let it be, we 
take it that they agree with it and we proceed. Sometimes they cannot respond, and we must 
also understand that sometimes they cannot reply (because of political issues), so if they don’t 
react negatively, it is approval by default or silence. And so you must understand this is silent 
consent and just take it and move on. And so it is really about understanding each other. We 
want audit records, and for them they say ‘oh, some things are very fuzzy, we better not have 
any records, we cannot agree black and white, but never mind, grey is fine.” 
        (Interview, May 2007) 
 
Most of the senior managers interviewed shared the view that reports suggesting conflicts and 
disagreements between Singaporean officials and their Chinese counterparts in the process of 
transferring and implementing management knowledge and policies were largely exaggerated and 
superficial. When asked whether the training program encountered any form of difficulties or 
resistance from the Chinese due to language, cultural barriers or even differences in prior 
management styles, both the Singaporean and Suzhou official interviewed all said no. According 
to a former Suzhou bureaucrat: 
 
“In my personal opinion, both sides worked very well together on the training programs. A lot 
of priority was given to them and there was also a lot of advanced planning. Based on this 
planning, training schedules were developed and we were sent to Singapore for training. 
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During this process, I have never really felt as though there were any problems or areas which 
could be improved on.” 
         (Interview, July 2007) 
 
Some have suggested that the software transfer program between the Singapore and Suzhou 
governments has been problematic or has had limited effectiveness due to a lack of support and 
enthusiasm from the local Suzhou government as well as inapplicability of the Singapore model 
of development to Suzhou (Thomas, 2001). However, interviews conducted with present and 
former senior working officials at both CSSD and SIPAC who were participants as well as 
initiators of the software transfer program from both countries, all yielded independent 
concurrence that the software transfer program has been without a doubt, a success. In response 
to Thomas’s paper, one of the former Suzhou bureaucrat commented: 
 
“With regards to this paper, I have also read it. In truth, (this paper’s) understanding of the 
subject is not that strong…What (was) said was that both sides should ‘congchangjiyi, 
kanyaoyuanyidian’ (plan with the long term in mind, ‘从长计议, 看遥远一点)’. Reality 
today has proven that this is the case. The first problem (with this paper) is that the 
understanding of the subject is not strong enough. The next problem is how it measures success 
of the program. To measure success, we should first look at ‘xiaoguo’ (results, ‘效果’), then 
‘pinggu’ (evaluation, 评估’), and finally ‘ganshou’ (feeling, ‘感受’). The results today already 
prove that the program has indeed been good and successful. Today, the SIP is managed very 
well, be it in urban planning or environmental planning and so forth. We have also learnt 
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many things from Singapore. The next measurement is evaluation. The Americans only focus 
on one dimension. However, everyone in our country, including our top leaders as well as 
Singapore’s leaders, all have a very good and high assessment of this aspect of the project. The 
next measurement involves the personal revelations and feelings of all the participants. 
Throughout our participation in the software transfer program, we have always felt that this 
was a very necessary, important and meaningful program…That is why I say these three 
measures are very important. You cannot simply use your own criteria and apply it to our 
situation and say ‘oh, there is a problem with this’.” 
        (Interview, July 2007) 
 
For the officials and bureaucrats interviewed, the most obvious physical indicators that the 
software transfer program has been a success, have been in terms of how it has changed the way 
in which the Suzhou officials work and think, and also the extent to which Suzhou has adapted 
some of Singapore’s policies to fit effectively into their own unique context. To them, the success 
of the software transfer program should not be linked directly to the financial performance of the 
SIP since it was meant to be a separate initiative at the government-to-government level. 
However, the best measure of success for the software transference program according to both 
the Singapore and the local Suzhou Municipal Governments is how the Suzhou Government 
had not just adopted what it had learnt, but took on board the concepts and experiences it 
acquired during the transference process, and more importantly, adapted foreign practices and 
behavior to fit into the local Suzhou social and economic context. Evidence of such successful 
adaptation can be seen in the various new policies that the Suzhou Municipal Government 
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developed, for e.g. a localized Suzhou version of the Singapore Central Provident Fund (CPF) 
System, housing and public security reforms such as setting up of neighborhood police posts and 
subsidized housing, as well as an emphasis on developing higher education. For the participants 
involved, the software training program’s greatest achievement was in stimulating change 
amongst the Chinese participants, instilling in them new ideas, methods, and policy-making skill 
sets for a more pro-business and service-inclined approach toward foreign investors. According to 
almost all of the respondents, most Chinese managerial staff within the SIP appeared to have 
‘assimilated’ or at least accepted the Singapore corporate culture when it came to work processes, 
particularly in the emphasis of speed efficiency and courting of foreign investors. However 
whether this was a result of top-down orders, or a more pragmatic approach to acquiring new 
skills regardless of the source and method, none of the respondents were willing or able to 
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                   CHAPTER 4: ‘THE SHOE JUST DOESN’T FIT’ – 
HOW THE SIP WAS UNSUITABLE FOR INVESTORS 
 
While the software transfer program may have been a success in the SIP collaboration, other 
aspects of the national level joint venture have been less rewarding. In particular, the SIP 
continually failed to attract the level of foreign investment that it had initially targeted to achieve, 
and was forced to revise its targets to match expectations on several occasions. Although the 
Asian Financial Crisis and competition from the neighboring industrial parks may have 
contributed to the poor financial performance of the SIP prior to 2001, research conducted for 
this paper uncovered other important aspects to the SIP which may also explain for the lackluster 
results of the SIP especially before the handover. Studying in particular the trend of Japanese 
FDI within SIP, chapter 4 argues that one of the reasons why the SIP underperformed during 
the early years is that it failed to adequately factor in the existing investor and industry profile 
within the Suzhou region, as well as the investment pattern of foreign FDI in China. This is best 
illustrated in how the SIP continually failed to attract important partners such as Japanese 
foreign investors, who were one of the original key target investors for the SIP. Hence while the 
SIP ploughed significant resources into developing the infrastructure of the park, it resulted in 
the provision of technically advanced and superior infrastructure and services that were not well 
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4.1 Restructuring the SIP – Problems and Allegations 
Signs that trouble was brewing between the Singapore Government and the Suzhou Municipal 
Government surfaced as early as 1997 just as the Asian Financial Crisis developed (Loh 1997a 
Straits Times;  Chua 1997b Straits Times). Eventually, both governments mutually agreed to a 
new working arrangement and in June 1999, the Singapore and Suzhou Municipal Governments 
signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) officially drawing to a close the original 
collaboration structure as it was first conceived. With this new MOU, the proportion of shares 
held by the Chinese and Singapore consortiums were adjusted with the Chinese becoming the 
majority shareholder with 65 percent in CSSD, and with Singapore’s portion reduced to just 35 
percent. This new arrangement also confirmed that Singapore would only complete the first 8 
square kilometers of land development, and leave the remainder of the original 70 square 
kilometers of land for its Chinese counterparts to develop (Xinhua News Agency, 28 June 1999). 
Although both sides tried to put a positive spin to the restructuring, this initiative by the 
Singapore government essentially meant that it was washing its hands off the project. 
Commenting on the decision, then Singapore Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, Mr Khaw Boon Wan was quoted as acknowledging: 
 
“Like all big projects, we have encountered problems in implementation. Out of these serious 
consultations, we have pragmatically acknowledged the operating constraints and successfully 
formulated a good package of solutions on the best way to advance the project under the 
circumstances.” 
  (June 1999) 
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Since then, there have been many attempts to explain and identify the factors leading to the 
break-down in working relations and Singapore’s decision to withdraw from this high profile 
government collaboration.  
 
4.2 Probable but Insufficient Causes? 
 
This chapter focuses on the debate surrounding the financial performance of the SIP, namely in 
terms of investment figures and how the SIP performed in attracting new foreign investors into 
the park. One of the commonly cited reasons for the lackluster financial performance of the SIP 
has been linked to the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis. The crisis had a chain effect leading to 
weak economies, depressed currency values, and a drastic drop in the gross domestic product 
values of many countries, and apparently affected the development of the SIP in two ways. First, 
the crisis had a world-wide impact and this meant that international investors were now cautious 
about expanding their operations and were not that enthusiastic about looking for new 
investment locations and ventures elsewhere. As a result, the SIP experienced some difficulty in 
attracting new investments to the park. Second, the financial meltdown also directly affected the 
existing investors within the SIP. Most of the companies located within the park were from the 
manufacturing sector and hence were particularly sensitive to demand and supply shocks. The 
Asian Financial Crisis had led to a contraction in their product markets and hence demand for 
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Contrary to expectations, this research found that the Asian Financial Crisis may not have been a 
significant reason for the underperformance of the SIP. First, the SIP would not have been the 
only industrial park to feel the pinch in terms of a slow down in foreign investment trend. Given 
the high level of participation and influence by both the Singaporean and Chinese national 
governments, and the liberty that the SIP had in comparison to other industrial parks with 
regards to tax perks and incentives, the SIP should have had the required resources and support 
to tide it over at least during the interim period in contrast to its counterparts. In addition, the 
Chinese Central Government continued to allow special concessions for the SIP project 
throughout the Asian Financial Crisis. Duty-free privileges to high-tech investment projects for 
their equipment imports in the SIP persisted despite the Central Government removing this tax 
perk elsewhere nation-wide in the effort to break tariff barriers in anticipation of joining the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) (Straits Times, 13 August 1997). This decision elevated this 
flagship collaborative project to the same level as China’s five special economic zones (SEZ) and 
the Pudong New Area of Shanghai. This gave the SIP a special quota for duty-free imports of 
equipment until 2000 that was not extended to other industrial parks in China, including the 
SND and should have actually given the SIP an additional competitive edge (Lu, 1997a Business 
Times).  The SIP had started off moderately with a small average number of new investment 
projects coming into the park annually with little fluctuation during the initial years of operation 
before 1998, but it began to experiencing a growth in the actual number of new investment 
projects annually starting from 1997 as shown in Table 4.1 below. This is significant because it 
shows that investors were still coming into the SIP despite the onset of the crisis unlike claims 
made by the SIP.  
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Second, the Asian Financial Crisis is also not sufficient to explain why Singapore downloaded its 
share of the collaboration so abruptly especially at a time when the SIP was starting to make a 
turn-around on its financial performance. Singapore first voiced its displeasure at the state of the 
SIP in December 1997. However just months earlier during then Chinese Premier Li Peng’s visit 
to Singapore, both national governments reported being satisfied with the progress of the project 
(Choo, 1997 Straits Times). Similarly, just 1 month before Singapore made the announcement 
that it had proposed a restructuring of the SIP shareholding, it was reported in the Singapore 
Straits Times that the SIP’s tax revenue had actually surged by 79% the previous year (Straits 
Times, 24 May 1999). In fact, according to reports, the SIP had since 1997 made considerable 
progress. In 1998, the park achieved 5 billion yuan (US$602 million) worth of gross domestic 
product, up 33.4% over 1997, earning 402 million yuan (US$48 million) in income that year 
(Han, 1999 China Daily). It seemed then that the SIP was on the path to recovery. Even in 
February 1999, it was reported that in the previous year, the SIP bagged US$950 million in new 
investment contracts - US$150 million more than the official target of US$800 million for the 
year (Lu, 1999c Business Times). Despite the Asian Financial Crisis, the SIP still managed to 
clinch major investors such as world telecom giant Nokia to set up a US$129million 
manufacturing plant. To divest from the project at this particular juncture is puzzling since such 
a major decision would be considered a huge embarrassment all round and not economically 
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Table 4.1: Trend of New Investment Projects in the SIP 

































Sources: Compiled by author with information obtained from the SIP in 2007 
 
Lastly, the Singapore government had on many occasions reiterated that the SIP was a large-scale 
infrastructure project which required high start-up costs and depreciation. In response to 
concerns about the profitability of the collaboration, the Singapore Government had always 
taken the position that it was in it for the long haul, reiterating that it only expected the SIP to 
‘turn profitable only after seven or eight years’ (Wong, 1997 Straits Times). So the sudden shift 
in the Singapore government’s attitude towards the SIP collaboration just five years into the 
collaboration indicate that other underlying factors may have triggered the abrupt decision by 
Singapore to ‘wash their hands off’ this project. 
 
This research found that such underlying factors were related to the lack of sufficient 
understanding and preparation by the Singapore Government and Consortium toward the 
existing investment pattern and behavior of foreign investors in China, both at the point of 
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entering the project and throughout the period of collaboration. This resulted in a mismatch of 
offerings that were not well-received or demanded by the SIP’s target investors and resulted in 
the SIP facing difficulties in attracting investors, including those who were familiar with the 
Singapore style of management and industrial park practices, but were still reluctant or not 
interested in considering the SIP as the location for their businesses. Focusing specifically on 
Japanese foreign investment in the SIP, this chapter analyzes how the SIP was not suitable for 
Japanese investors and hence why the SIP had such a tough time convincing them to set up shop 
within the industrial park. Although this is not a comprehensive analysis of global foreign 
investment within the SIP, a study of the Japanese case in particular, sheds light on factors that 
may have influenced other foreign investors’ decision about investing in the SIP. More 
importantly, it is telling about the limitations and physical constraints about the SIP that 
hindered its growth.  
 
4.3       The Japanese Just Are Not That Interested in the SIP 
 
The issue of attracting Japanese foreign investors had long been a source of concern for the SIP, 
and was the trigger for several disagreements between the Singapore Government and the 
Suzhou Municipal Government. The reason for the emphasis placed on Japanese corporations 
alongside the larger-scale, high technology, better-established companies, such as the European 
and North American corporations within the Fortune 500 (which Singapore was familiar with), 
was simple. Japanese corporations have traditionally been amongst the most technically advanced 
investors in the world, and their presence is often useful in bringing about spillover technological 
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effects. Japan has also played an important role in the industrialization of Singapore, and many 
Japanese corporations were already familiar with the Singapore’s pro-business attitude, 
management and developed infrastructure skills, making it logical for the SIP to try to attract 
them. Japanese corporations also generally invest in capital intensive industries and are hence 
actively courted by governments overseas. The importance of Japanese direct foreign investment 
into the SIP could be seen from how then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong personally invited 
several Japanese investors to visit and took them on a tour of the SIP in 1997 (Straits Times 14 
December 1997). This could be one of the main reasons why Singapore and the SIP were so 
upset that several Japanese corporations decided to invest in the SND instead of the SIP. 
 
Interviews with former Singaporean bureaucrats of the SIP confirmed that what probably really 
caused then Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew to flare up and voice his displeasure to the Chinese 
Central Government during his trip to China in 1997, apparently involved the decision by a 
couple of Japanese investors to choose to invest in the SND instead of the SIP. A former senior 
Singaporean manager at the SIP revealed: 
 
“(Actually) it involved several big investors…one or two Japanese investors brought in by the 
Singapore side but ended up in the SND because they came in and saw that it was cheaper 
over there.” 
        (Interview, May 2007) 
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That Singapore was upset is understandable given the fact that they were the ones who first 
initiated contact with the said Japanese corporations and SIPAC had already spent significant 
efforts in courting Japanese FDI into the industrial park. However when pressed further on 
whether the Suzhou Municipal Government had resorted to ‘unfair tactics’ to divert these 
Japanese investors to the SND, and why these Japanese investors chose the SND over the SIP, 
this same manager  acknowledged: 
 
“The Suzhou government didn’t have to do anything. They (the Japanese) went there and 
they saw (for themselves). It is like you come into a Mercedes showroom, and next door is a 
Toyota showroom, and you think, ‘ok, I am happy with Toyota, then let’s go for Toyota’. 
That’s all. Of course the Toyota showmen try very hard to lure you over, but that’s basically 
the case. But it involved one very big investor that was going to SND and we were asking the 
Suzhou people to swing it to the SIP, but they refused saying...’this investor wanted to go to 
the SND (out of their own choice). We cannot be the ones to force them to the SIP.” 
        (Interview, May 2007) 
 
Despite suspicions from Singapore that the Suzhou Municipal Government had unfairly helped 
to lobby these Japanese investors over to the SND, it was apparent that these Japanese investors 
chose their investment location based on their own justifications with little or minimal influence 
from the Suzhou Municipal Government. Former Singaporean bureaucrats interviewed admitted 
that the Suzhou Municipal Government, contrary to claims made in media reports, had been 
very supportive toward the SIP, and whenever possible, would prioritize the SIP in whichever 
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way possible. However the Suzhou Municipal Government was firm in their stance with regards 
to this case. 
 
“(It was) not that they didn’t want to help, but (this time) we asked them to force one investor 
over, but this one they could not, and so we said ‘Since you cannot, that means you are not 
putting your heart into the SIP.” 
        (Interview, May 2007) 
 
It was obvious that Singapore and the SIP were ‘anxious’ about not being able to attract these 
and other Japanese investors even with the provision of better infrastructure resources and 
management at the SIP.  ‘Threats’ and pressure were supposedly exerted on the Suzhou 
Municipal government to play what Singapore called ‘positive discrimination’ or risked having a 
fall-out in the collaboration. 
 
“And so in the end, we then said, ‘You are not keen to support the SIP. We spend so much 
effort to develop the SIP, then we try to get you to play by positive discrimination to try to 
promote the SIP and swing projects to the SIP  but  you are not prepared to do it.’ That was 
the fundamental problem. So we ‘accused’ the Suzhou people of not wholeheartedly putting 
their resources into the SIP.” 
        (Interview, May 2007) 
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A reason motivating the SIP’s aggressiveness in pursuing these Japanese corporations during this 
period lies in the fact that although the number of new investment projects was on the rise, the 
new investment amounts were smaller and thus the contracted and actualized investment 
amount in the SIP was on the decline (shown in Table 4.2). This could be one of the reasons 
why the SIP and Singapore were so eager to capture the interest of their target Japanese 
corporations and get them to invest in the SIP especially during this crucial period. 
 
4.4    Why can’t we get them Interested in the SIP? 
 
There were several reasons why the SIP was unable to lure Japanese investors into the park 
despite dangling all sorts of incentives and motivations to get their attention and boost their 
confidence. Some of these were unforeseen factors that the SIP were not able to control or 
manipulate, while others were considerations that the Singapore Government should have taken 
note of during its decision process to embark on a joint-collaboration with the Suzhou 
Municipal Government, given the nature of the joint-venture and the location for such an 
industrial park.  
 
Wrong Timing: The SND had the Lead  
 
Compared to many of its Asian neighbors, Singapore was slow in investing in China. Prior to 
1992, most Singaporean investments in China involved a relatively small amount coming 
primarily from private investors (Chau, 1992 Reuters News). Then China’s Minister for Foreign 
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Trade and Economic Cooperation, Wu Yi in fact made reference to the small presence of 
Singaporean investment in China by calling Singapore investors ‘small potatoes’ in early 1993, 
because from the Chinese vantage point, investors from Singapore lacked boldness and speed.  
She cautioned that if Singapore did not catch up to speed with the aggressiveness of the other 
countries, it would soon miss the boat to take advantage of the multiple opportunities present 
during the early stages of China’s open market reforms. The impetus for the SIP came from this 
‘wake-up’ call from the Chinese Central leaders and Singapore was eager to make up for lost time 
as quickly as possible. Singapore leaders also acknowledged their shortcomings by calling for 
Singapore to ‘get airborne’ (Goad, 1994 The Wall Street Journal).  
  
Table 4.2: Actualized Foreign Investment Sum in the SIP 


























Source: Compiled by author with information obtained from SIP 2007 
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Singapore sought to assert its presence in China through what it thought would be a landmark 
national-level project, in order to catch up with the developments that other countries had 
already made in China. However, the Chinese Central Government had cautioned that while 
China placed great importance on the Suzhou township development, the proposal for the SIP 
was not entirely unique. The Chinese were also frank in noting that Singapore was not the first 
to have a consortium-led development of a Chinese township. A Japanese consortium had beaten 
Singapore to it in Dalian and a Hongkong-Japanese consortium had also done likewise in 
Yangpu on Hainan Island. The Japanese were in fact amongst the earliest foreign investors to 
venture into China and had by then accumulated substantial amount of experience in doing 
business in China. 
 
When asked why the SIP had much lower numbers of Japanese investors than the SND, a 
Chinese bureaucrat who has been working in the SIP since 1994  adamantly stated that the SIP 
in all ways was superior to the SND, but conceded that the SND was probably ‘luckier’ because 
it opened earlier and the Japanese investors ‘just happened to settle down there first’. According 
to him, it was simply a ‘natural coincidence’, and not that the SIP had any flaws causing Japanese 
investors to shun them.  This same bureaucrat also argued that why Japanese investors were slow 
into coming into the SIP was because the SIP was set up later when the Japan was experiencing a 
downturn in its economy and hence, Japanese corporations were cautious about expanding their 
operations abroad.  
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The opening of the SND at the turn of the 1990s was critical for its success and coincided with 
significant events such as the open development of the Pudong District, whereby it was able to 
capitalize on the large influx of international investors seeking to invest around in Shanghai and 
the surrounding cities. This was significant because it benefited from the aggressiveness in which 
investors like the Japanese entered the Chinese market during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Because of the soaring Japanese yen in the early to mid 1990s, many Japanese investors favored 
the SND because they were eager to get into Suzhou and could not wait any longer given the 
fluctuation in yen prices. Summing the situation up, then vice-secretary of the SND’s working 
committee Wang Fukang voiced confidence about the SND which was developed in 1990 over 
the SIP in attracting investors, pointing out SND’s maturity over the SIP: 
 
“Our district here already has an atmosphere, and instead of being a threat, the emergence of 
the Singapore Township has brought us some advantages. People can make comparisons, and 
the end results are usually to our favor.” 
     (South China Morning Post, 10 May 1995) 
 
The SND was considered the first mover in terms of a large scale modernized industrial park 
within Suzhou and the advantages associated with being the first mover could be seen in its rapid 
development just five years after it opened. By 1996, it had accumulated US$3 billion of 
investment in the district, with more than 80% of it being overseas investment (Li, 1997 
Business Weekly). It had also succeeded in attractive over 50 top multinationals from Japan, the 
U.S., Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Taiwan. In comparison, the SIP was only able 
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to attract the smaller Japanese suppliers and not the large Japanese corporations. The reasons for 
this lie in how Japanese multinational corporations operate and what the basis for their choice of 
investment location in China are.   
 
a) Locational Determinants of Japanese FDI in China: SIP could not attract the Japanese 
MNCs 
That the SIP was having difficulty in attracting Japanese investors was a fact acknowledged by 
the SIP. The SIP was only able to attract a small number of Japanese suppliers and not the big 
corporations that they were targeting. Alluding to this, the SIP commented during a briefing in 
announcing an interest by two of Japan’s top conglomerates Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsui 
& Co Ltd in joining the SIP: 
 
“To date, the Japanese investors who have signed up are not the big companies but rather 
their suppliers. We hoe that if Mitsubishi and Mitsui take the lead, it will be easier to attract 
big companies to come in.” 
       (The Straits Times, 8 November 1994) 
 
However, information revealed during the interviews showed that the SIP continued to be not 
very successful in bringing in more Japanese investments in the subsequent years, resulting in the 
frustration aired by the Singapore Government in late 1997 over how certain Japanese 
corporations chose again to locate in the SND rather than the SIP. While the SIP struggled to 
find means to attract the Japanese corporations, the SND consistently proved to be a premier 
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choice for the large Japanese multinational corporations. By 1998, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, C. Itoh, 
Marubeni and Sumitomo of Japan, who were also amongst the top 100 enterprises in the world 
then, had already invested in the SND. Other large Japanese companies investing in the SND 
also include Nissho Iwai, Fujitsu, Matsushita Electric and Sony while the SIP only had a handful 
of Japanese Multinational corporations such as Hitachi and Sumitomo (Asia Pulse, 25 
November 1998; Reuters News, 3 July 1998; Japan Economic Newswire, 20 February 1995).  
 
While actual statistics from the SND are not available to compare its trend of inward Japanese 
investment flow to that of the SIP due to the sensitivity of allegations about the competition 
between the SIP and the SND, interviews with former senior managers at the SIP as well as 
current and former bureaucrats all confirm that the SND was definitely more successful in 
attracting the Japanese corporations than the SIP was. This research did however, managed to get 
hold of raw investment data for the SIP, and these statistics show that the SIP did experience a 
low influx of not just new Japanese investment projects but overall international investment 
projects during the 1990s (Table 4.3 and Table 4.4). The trend only started picking up after 
1999, coinciding with the announcement that Singapore would transfer its shares and 
management of the SIP back into the hands of the Suzhou Municipal Government, after which 
significantly, the Suzhou New District also became a partner and stakeholder in the SIP.  
 
b) Japanese Production Networks 
A unique feature about Japanese companies and investors that has been noted previously is that 
of the tendency for the Japanese to cooperate in groups for competitive advantage (Womack et al. 
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1990). This is one of the reasons that this research identified as a major hurdle n the SIP 
attracting more Japanese investors into its park. Japanese FDI and Japanese firms have a 
tendency to create ‘exclusive production networks’ (Borrus, 1992). The logic of such production 
networks is to increase competitiveness at all levels of the value-added chain. They would exist 
spatially as clusters of firms, use Japanese suppliers exclusively, regardless of price and quality, 
rely on intra-firm channels for the movement of goods, and are export-oriented to retain market 
share and be fiercely competitive (Okamoto, 1993). With Japanese FDI more globalized now 
then ever before, such production networks have similarly established themselves in their new 
host countries and as relationships between firms become denser, cluster networks develop with 
the re-location of Japanese sub-contractors to host countries.  
 
Table 4.3:  Trend of New Investment Projects in the SIP 
Trend of New Investment Projects in the Suzhou Industrial Park 





























ts Number of NewInvestment Projects
 
Source: Compiled by author with information obtained from SIP 2007 
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Japanese investment is characterized by large conglomerates and their keiretsu. Keiretsu are 
networks between companies not legally united but held together by cross-shareholding. These 
networks are essential based on the principals of agglomeration, to capitalize on different types of 
externalities generated by locating together, sharing resources and specialized skills to reduce cost, 
increase productivity or simply just to block out competition. Each keiretsu is made up of around 
twenty companies, one in each industrial sector. Typically in each keiretsu, there is a bank, an 
insurance company and a trading company. These keiretsu or intricate business networks are not 
by themselves cost effective. Where they get their competitive advantage in terms of cost and 
productivity efficiency is from the supporting industries such as the backward and forward 
integration and networks of SME suppliers and sub-contractors (shita-uke) relevant to their 
production and output logistics (Porter 1990). The primary purposes of these networks are to 
lower costs, raise funds and eschew foreign-takeover and competition (Macmillan, 1985). The 
three main forms of keiretsu are:    
 
Horizontal: diverse sector companies with a main bank connecting them 
Vertical: supplier network of companies 
Distribution: manufacturing companies and their sales outlets 
 
Japanese firms seek to group together to take advantage of agglomeration economies of scale. 
Clustering lets firms attract a pool of specialized labor and the production of new ideas, based on 
the accumulation of human capital and face-to-face communications. Other benefits include 
allowing for mass production that allows for economies of scale and making specialized input 
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services more readily available, providing the incentive for firms within the cluster to constantly 
upgrade their infrastructure (Marshal, 1920; Stelzer, 1991). Firms also benefit from lower costs 
that are not passed on to firms outside the cluster such as lower transportation costs if firms are 
all located within close proximity of each other.  
 
Table 4.4: Number of New Japanese Investment Projects in the SIP 
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Source: Compiled by author with information obtained from SIP 2007 
 
Because of this clustering behavior, it was crucial that the SIP manage to get the large Japanese 
corporations in first, as it was likely the entry of these corporations would have a domino-effect, 
attracting their related group of companies or suppliers to join the SIP as well. In fact, one of the 
intended impacts of trying to attract Mitsui and Mitsubishi was that this chain effect would 
occur as the Mitsui group alone comprised of over 800 subsidiary and affiliated companies which 
would likely come up with their own projects for the SIP (Williams, The Straits Times, 8 
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November 1994). The SND’s strength in attracting the large Japanese Multinational 
Corporations as shown earlier was central in ensuring that it had a steady flow of the smaller and 
mid-sized Japanese supplier firms entering the SND to support the output of the large 
corporations. The SND’s provisions were also more suitable for the promulgation of such 
Japanese business networks. It managed to get Sumitomo Bank to open a branch bank in SND, 
being only the second foreign-funded bank in the whole of Jiangsu Province. The Japanese 
Sanwa Bank was also approved to open an agency in SND (Xinhua Daily 21 April 1997). The 
presence of multiple Japanese banks in the SND made it more convenient for Japanese 
corporations to conduct their business within the SND while maintaining crucial banking links 
to Japan in contrast to the SIP. 
 
Although the SIP’s superior infrastructure and services was a draw for some Japanese investors, 
many of these frequently raise that the costs at the SIP were too high and not competitive 
enough. Manufacturing firms in particular generally face more complicated location decisions 
than retail or service firms because the cost of their inputs is different at each location. Not only 
must they account for the transport of their inputs, they also need to factor costing involved for 
the transportation of their finished products. Because manufacturing firms have little or no 
control over prices and hence to maximize profits, they must minimize costs. Choosing where to 
locate their production is thus important to manufacturing firms for minimizing costs, and least-
cost locations can depend on several factors such as rents, land prices and labor costs. That the 
SND had lower land costs was a very attractive factor influencing firms’ decisions to locate there. 
As proof of the conduciveness and attraction of the SND for Japanese investors, in 1999, a well-
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known Japanese Research Institution named the SND as the industrial park in China that has 
the most potential and drive.  
 
c) Cultural Differences 
Finally, another reason that may have contributed to Japanese corporations’ preference for the 
SND could be in the differences in which the SIP and the SIP handled personal relations with 
their investors. According to a former senior general manager at the SIP, Singaporeans and 
officials within the SIP were ‘just too clean, and too good’ and suggested that for the SIP, it was 
all very black and white, and no mixing of business with pleasure.  SND officials were apparently 
more flexible and aggressive, willing to spend additional effort outside of work entertaining 
potential investors just to seal the deal. While the SIP stressed that all its officials and bureaucrats 
be proficient in English, the SND required more from its employees, hiring candidates who were 
not only fluent in English, but also Japanese. This made the SND a more welcoming 
environment for Japanese corporations locating within the park. In the words of a current senior 
SIP bureaucrat: 
 
“The SND is actually more suitable for the Japanese (and Taiwanese corporations) than the 
SIP is.”           
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CHAPTER 5: LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLITICS –PUTTING SUZHOU NEW 
DISTRICT FIRST, SUZHOU INDUSTRIAL PARK SECOND 
 
Having considered how foreign investment patterns and investor behavior may have affected the 
performance of the SIP, Chapter 5 explores how local politics may have contributed to the 
demise of the collaboration between the Singapore and Suzhou government. The SIP had faced 
hurdles from several levels: first at the provincial level during the pre-approval stage and; second, 
allegedly from the Suzhou Municipal Government and its agents during the operational phase of 
the SIP. Focusing on the local government structure in China, the relationships between the 
Jiangsu Province and Suzhou City, and the reward system of local government officials and 
employees, this chapter analyzes why the Jiangsu Provincial Government had reservations about 
the project and why the Suzhou Municipal Government may have felt inclined to promote the 
SND over the SIP as alleged by the Singapore government on a number of occasions. It argues 
that the Singapore government failed to sufficiently consider the complex local political situation 
in China prior to investing and proceeding with this national level joint collaboration and that 
this was another reason that contributed to the slow performance of the SIP before the Suzhou 
Government took over the reins in 2001. 
 
5.1    Early Resistance: Jiangsu Provincial Government’s Ambivalence towards the SIP 
 
The proposal for the SIP first met with resistance during the negotiation period when the 
Suzhou Municipal government had to table the proposal for the SIP to the Central government 
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for approval. The Suzhou Municipality and the Mayor of Suzhou were extremely supportive 
about the collaboration and promised their Singapore counterparts with preferential operational 
and tax perks along with other special treatment once the project took off. However, before 
proceeding further to iron out the contractual details, the Mayor of Suzhou had to follow the 
administrative procedures of the Central government to put it through the provincial 
government first, before the proposal for the joint-venture collaboration could be put up to the 
Central government for assessment and approval. The Mayor of Suzhou needed hence to first get 
the Jiangsu Provincial Governor’s stamp of approval on the project before the Jiangsu Provincial 
Government could submit this for review at the Central level.   
 
On the surface, this appeared to be a straightforward administrative process that Singapore 
assumed would not hinder the progress of the collaboration but it soon learnt that local 
government politics in China could pose a significant hurdle in the smooth progression of their 
planned collaboration. According to a former senior Singaporean bureaucrat party to the 
negotiation process, the Mayor of Suzhou hinted early on that the proposal for such a unique 
and high level government-to-government collaboration between the Suzhou Municipal 
Government and the Singapore Government may not be that warmly received by the Jiangsu 
Provincial Government. Sources interviewed claim that the Jiangsu Provincial Government on 
learning about the intentions of the Suzhou Municipal Government in pursuing an industrial 
park joint venture tied with a software transfer program, was indeed initially lukewarm and 
skeptical about the prospects for this project and was not enthusiastic about pushing this up to 
the Central authorities. The Suzhou Municipal Government was therefore concerned that this 
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might mean pulling the plug on the proposed plans for the SIP. The same senior Singaporean 
bureaucrat who was also a personal acquaintance of the Mayor of Suzhou revealed that at that 
point, there were speculations that the Jiangsu Provincial Governor in particular was not 
receptive about the planed Singapore-Suzhou collaboration because such high profile 
collaboration may catapult the Mayor of Suzhou to higher political ranking at his expense.  
 
Worried that plans for the SIP might fall through, the Mayor of Suzhou apparently embarked on 
a contingency plan that involved backdoor political lobbying and by-passing of the structural 
hierarchy of the Chinese government. Based on fieldwork conducted for this research and 
interviews with former Singapore bureaucrats, the Suzhou Municipal Government apparently 
advised the Singapore Government that for their interest to be realized, it would be more 
effective if the Singapore Government could approach the Chinese Central Government from a 
national project angle to first get their interest. If the Singapore Government could convince 
their Chinese counterparts on the benefits of this project and get their support, then the Suzhou 
Municipal Government was fairly confident that the Jiangsu Provincial Government would then 
have little choice but to approve of the subject as well.   
 
To further increase the chances of success at the Central level, it was suggested to the Singapore 
Government that they try to garner the support of former leader Deng Xiaoping, who still had 
significant influence within the Chinese Central Government. The Mayor of Suzhou supposedly 
acted as a critical middle man, setting up a private meeting with Deng Xiaoping through his son, 
Deng Pufang, whom which the Mayor of Suzhou had personal contacts with. Capitalizing on 
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Deng Xiaoping’s favorable impression of Singapore, this meeting was set up during then 
Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Ong Teng Cheong’s and Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s visit 
to Suzhou in early April 1993. The purposes of the meeting was to brief Deng Xiaoping on the 
proposal, and get his support by convincing him that the project would not benefit just Suzhou, 
but also the rest of China. Based on minutes of the meeting, it appeared that Deng Pufang and 
the other Chinese officials present during this meeting were excited about the Singapore 
government’s proposal. The general feeling was that Singapore’s proposal had come at a very apt 
time when China was replacing its economic system with a socialist market economy. The 
Chinese were still learning what it took to become a market economy and hence there was little 
understanding of what should be copied and what should not. Singapore’s proposal was needed 
in China as it was experiencing numerous problems in its transition to a market economy as seen 
by the worrying inflation rate that surfaced around that time. Against this backdrop of reform 
and the move to acquire skills necessary to develop a market economy, both Deng Xiaoping and 
his son expressed support for the project, and Singapore was assured that the proposal would be 
tabled directly to President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng soon.  
 
The Singapore Government eventually managed to engage the Chinese Central Government and 
convince them of the benefits from the planned collaboration and it was not long before the 
Central Government indicated support for the proposed SIP venture. It was only then that all 
local governments involved, including the Jiangsu Provincial Government, started to get their 
whole machinery started on the project. A senior Singaporean bureaucrat confirmed the initial 
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resistance from the Jiangsu Provincial Governement and the politics involved between the 
Suzhou Municipal Government’s and Jiangsu Provincial Government’s individuals: 
  
“They (province) weren’t full-hearted until Beijing said 100% that they agreed (to go ahead 
with the collaboration). Then, they (province) put (their) own man to take over the project 
and the Mayor…was deposed (from this project). This is their politics.” 
         (Interview, May 2007) 
 
There were reasons as to why the Jiangsu Provincial Government and Governor were initially 
ambivalent about the proposed SIP collaboration. Amongst the more pressing reasons were: 
 
a) Concern about Macroeconomic Reforms –Interregional Disparity 
Information gathered during the course of fieldwork for this research suggests that the Jiangsu 
Provincial Governor may not have been enthusiastic about the SIP proposal when it was put up 
to him in 1993 for a number of political and economic reasons. The SIP proposal came at a time 
when the Chinese economy was plagued by overheating, inflation and speculation in property 
and security markets (Xinhua News Agency, 1993).  As early as mid 1992, the Central 
Government had been alarmed by the growth of capital construction and the development of 
various economic development zones in localities, and the Central Government was keen to cool 
down the economy especially on the part of provincial, particularly coastal leaders as prominent 
studies showed that huge regional income disparities and the shortage of central revenue led to 
the break up of the former Yugoslavia (Hu and Wang, 1993; Lee, 2000). These measures came 
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in the form of a new tax-assignment system, fenshuizhi, which was implemented nation wide 
with the aim of providing adequate revenues for the Central Government. This new tax system 
was not well received by coastal provincial leaders especially Guangdong, Shanghai and Jiangsu, 
but through a series of compromise, both Guangdong and Shanghai eventually agreed to comply 
with the new system. However, the Party Secretary of Jiangsu, Shen Daren, was sacked by the 
Central authorities in October 1993 for his defiant attitude towards the tax reform. This served 
as a warning to other provincial leaders on the consequences of not complying with Central 
directives.  
 
The Jiangsu Provincial Government was faced with a dilemma. Although it was one of the most 
prosperous provinces in China, it faced serious interregional inequality across the Jiangsu 
Province between Sunan, Suzhong and Subei. Sunan, in which Suzhou is located, has long been 
one of China’s most prosperous agricultural and commercial bases, while Subei having a less 
favorable location and less natural resources and infrastructure development has continued to 
decline in relativity. This disparity generated considerable concerns for the provincial 
government as figures indicate that since the late 1980s, with the emphasis of reforms shifted 
towards a more socialist market economy and open door policies, Sunan had outgrown Subei 
and Suzhong by a large margin and the Sunan-Subei divide had been intensified. During the 
reform period, Jiangsu witnessed a rapid increase in interregional inequality (Yehua Dennis Wei, 
2000).  In line with the Central Government’s new concerns about income disparity, this was a 
problem that the Jiangsu Provincial Governor had to address quickly.  The SIP proposal meant 
that Suzhou Municipal City (located in Sunan) would reap the direct benefits from the project, 
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and this was a source of concern. The Jiangsu Provincial Government had been following a 
system of ‘city-leading-county’ since 1983. Under this system, the governments of prefecture-
level cities like Suzhou were meant to administer surrounding counties and county-level cities, 
the effect of which was expected to help develop these fringe areas faster as the former reap 
benefits from having more resources and support (Wei 1994). However, statistics also show that 
reform and open door policies have been largely biased towards Sunan in general with the most 
favorable policies and largest open district all located in Sunan. This concentration of FDI in 
Sunan had provided abundant capital for its economy and had stimulated the rapid growth of 
Sunan, while Subei lagged far behind (Yehua, 2000, pp 191). Giving the green light for a major 
industrial park venture to take place in Suzhou may further increase the gap between the regions.  
 
b) Central Government Politics 
Complicating the Jiangsu Provincial Government’s decision to support the SIP proposal more 
were the alleged conflicts between the Central authorities and Deng Xiaoping who tried to 
accelerate the development made at the National People’s Congress session in March 1993, in 
defiance of the central proposal to cool down the economy. There was a lack of consensus 
between central and local government leaders and economists on whether the national economy 
was overheated, and Deng Xiaoping in particular was adamant that the existing economic 
policies aimed at accelerating market reforms were still benefiting the economy and that the 
Central Government should not deviate from the direction he had set earlier. Deng Xiaoping’s 
lobbying may have played a critical role in getting the Central Government to agree with the SIP 
project. This was however not based on a consensus on the merits of the project itself, but on the 
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personal influence of Deng himself. The Central Government was cautious in appearing not to 
openly contradict Deng Xiaoping and his policy agendas, but just one month later in April 1993, 
Jiang Zemin clearly signaled the Central government’s position by calling for a strengthening of 
macroeconomic control to achieve a balance between aggregate demand and supply and to 
straighten out the distribution relations between the central and provincial governments by 
reforming the public finance system. This meant a departure from the earlier policy of aggressive 
market opening reforms and served as a caution against overheating and regional income 
disparities.  
 
Although Deng Xiaoping had in his earlier private meeting with DPM Ong and SM Lee that he 
would put forward the SIP proposal to the Central leaders and personally support it, it became 
obvious that the Central Government had reservations about the collaboration. According to 
sources, when then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong apparently met up with Chinese Premier Li 
Peng in late April 1993 and brought up the subject of  a potential collaboration between the two 
governments, Premier Li claimed no apparent knowledge about the joint-venture. Despite being 
briefed further on the details of the collaboration, Premier Li remained lukewarm about such 
prospects and made little commitment on whether the Central Government would support this 
initiative.  
 
At that time, the Mayor of Suzhou suggested that this lack of enthusiasm was because the 
Central Government feared that the proposal from the Singapore government would infringe 
upon Chinese sovereignty. According to former Singapore bureaucrat, a message was conveyed to 
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by the Suzhou government to the Singapore government to take on the subject directly with 
Beijing: 
 
“He (Mayor) came…and sent a message to (our) Senior Minister to tell (our) President to try 
to lobby Beijing…in May 1993, when Ong Teng Cheong visited Beijing and met up with 
Zhu Rongji and Jiang Zemin, there was quite a bit of resistance from the Chinese camp 
because the concept of giving Singapore a piece of land to run Singapore style reminded them 
of the concession that China had to give to the Western powers. So this to them, was a 
humiliating experience…so the nationalistic feeling was prevailing at that time. You see, to 
the Chinese, it is like ‘卖国贼’ (‘maiguozei’, traitor), so the Mayor was afraid that he would 
be labeled as one, so he was lobbying for us to go to Beijing to explain to the leaders that they 
are not giving up their sovereignty, (that) it is not about sovereignty issues, but (about) a 
cooperation.” 
        (Interview, April 2007) 
 
According to sources, the Jiangsu Provincial Governor may not have been un-enthusiastic about 
the SIP proposal, but given the example of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Secretary, was waiting for 
some a clear signal from the Central Government before deciding whether it would be a 
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5.2   Privileged Treatment for the SND? 
 
Stiff competition from a neighboring industrial park, the Suzhou New District (SND) has often 
been cited as a critical factor affecting the development and performance of the SIP, and this 
proved to be a particularly sore point for the Singapore government. Annoyance at the manner in 
which the SND conducted its marketing activities and the participation of the Suzhou 
Municipal Government in promoting the SND surfaced late 1997 when then SM Lee during a 
tour of China, was quoted as having said that between the SIP and the SND, the Suzhou 
government needed to decide which industrial park project it was going to back whole-heartedly. 
This was the first public statement by the Singapore side that all was not well with the then 
three-year-old SIP. Accusations were levied against the local Suzhou Government that it was not 
keeping its promises to devote all its attention and priorities into promoting and developing the 
SIP, and that it was instead diverting critical resources and new foreign investors into their own 
SND (Loh, 1997b Straits Times).  
 
It was alleged that the SND had allegedly on more than one occasion, went after the same 
foreign investors as the SIP and Singapore was also unhappy that investors it brought in ended 
up being diverted to the SND. More importantly, it appeared that officials from the Suzhou 
government were actively promoting the SND while undermining the status of the SIP overseas. 
One particular case is often cited as evidence of this. Then Vice-Mayor of Suzhou, Wang Jin 
Hua, who was also the Chairman of the SND at that particular point of time, was accused of 
having openly discredited the SIP during an investment recruitment trip to Germany, apparently 
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telling potential investors that it was the SND that had the support of the Central Government 
and that potential investors should just directly invest with the SND and not waste time in the 
SIP (Chua, 1997a Straits Times; Straits Times, 10 December 1997; Pereira 2003).). 
 
Singapore also alleged that Suzhou Municipal Government had sanctioned unfair marketing and 
operational practices and competition by the SND to the detriment of the SIP. Singapore was 
concerned that the SND was falsely representing itself to international investors, by adopting 
very similar practices and even brand platforms such as naming its website ‘CS-SND’ (similar to 
SIP’s ‘CS-SIP’), which to Singapore, was confusing and would mislead potential investors into 
thinking that it was the same as the SIP or managed by Singapore. Another cause for contention 
between these 2 industrial parks was that of land prices. According to reports, SND had 
significantly lower land prices than the SIP and its apparent practice of pegging land prices and 
rentals on a ‘moving-target’ principle meant that it constantly undermined the attractiveness and 
competitiveness of the SIP to foreign investors (Pereira 2003).  
 
5.3 Why Favor the SND over the SIP? 
 
Despite all the allegations that the SND was operating unfairly against the SIP, and that the 
Suzhou Municipal Government was privileging the SND over the SIP, the response from the 
Central and Local Suzhou Governments was muted. Although the Central Government 
continually assured the Singapore and SIP investors of their unwavering support for the SIP, 
their actions spoke otherwise about the level of support the Central and Local Governments had 
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for the SND versus the SIP. This was best demonstrated from the ‘Wang Jin Hua’ case, where 
no form of censure or punishment was meted out to the Vice-Mayor of Suzhou despite the 
damage the incident had potentially done to Sino-Singapore relations. In a telling move about 
the Central Government’s position on the issue, rather than to ‘demote’ the Vice-Mayor of 
Suzhou, its method of ‘appeasement’ involved a shuffling of personnel, most notably the transfer 
of the Mayor of Suzhou, then seen as a supporter of Singapore, out of the city and into another 
position. This was unexpected as the Mayor of Suzhou was one of the masterminds of the SIP 
and had until then, did as much as he could to support the Singapore Government and the SIP 
project.  
 
According to Singaporean sources, the Mayor of Suzhou was transferred to be Deputy Director 
of the Tourism Bureau, and this was in fact seen as a form of demotion. Based on the official 
ranks of the Chinese Cadre (Civil Servant) System, mayors of provincial cities, and chiefs of 
ministerial bureaus are of the same rank (although each individual may have a different grade 
level). That the Mayor of Suzhou was transferred to be just deputy bureau chief and not even 
head bureau chief was humiliating (Zhu, Li and E 1997). Despite having the same rank, a Mayor 
of a major Municipal City was seen to have more power and influence given his or her leadership 
over a sizeable population and access to local and central resources.  
 
Adding further to the tensions, the Suzhou Municipal Government also made weak attempts at 
pacifying their Singaporean counterparts. Rather than issue any statements to clarify the Vice-
Mayor’s intentions or apologize for the alleged misunderstanding, the Suzhou Municipal 
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Government created more doubts when it simply tried to downplay the issue by stating that the 
Vice-Mayor’s words had been misinterpreted. That Vice-Mayor Wang ‘escaped’ unscathed from 
this high profile incident and was instead ‘rewarded’ subsequently by the Central Government as 
will be shown later is telling and significant. Why the Vice-Mayor made such comments about 
the SIP and why the Central Government reacted mildly to this incident may be explained by 
first the relationship between the Central Government, the SND and SIP.  According to senior 
Suzhou and Singaporean bureaucrats interviewed, the Chinese Central Government was actually 
very detached from the day-to-day workings of the SIP. In comparison to how the Singapore 
Government regularly stood out for SIP related issues, the Central Government has maintained 
its distance. With regards to the problems that surfaced early between the collaborating parties, a 
former senior general manager commented that ‘the Central did not know anything about the 
conflicts’ and were thus caught off guard when subsequently approached by the Singapore 
Government.  
 
This research found that there were several critical underlying reasons for why the Suzhou 
Municipal Government may have favored the SND over the SIP, and also why the Chinese 
Central Government was not all that involved or interested in the daily proceedings and progress 
of the SIP. Most of these reasons relate to how the parties involved or affected by the 
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i. Employment Generation and Wages – The SND offers more 
Fiscal and administrative decentralization had made local governments pro-active economic 
actors and not just administrative civil servants, and as a result, there were plenty of incentives to 
outperform one another (Oi, 1999). The additional competitiveness brought about by the new 
economic direction was not just limited to within counties, municipalities, provinces and regions 
(Hendrischke and Feng, 1999). The competition was evident even across the various levels of 
local governments, and government ventures. A successful high profile international, high level 
government-to-government project would certainly propel Suzhou city into the limelight, and 
raise the exposure of the Suzhou Municipal Government amongst the Central Government 
authorities. However, interviews uncovered that the SIP collaboration was not particularly well 
received by the Suzhou Municipal Government. Although the then Mayor of Suzhou was a 
mastermind of the project and remained enthusiastic throughout his term as Mayor, interviews 
conducted reveal that many of the working level administrative staff within the local government 
were in fact resistant toward the joint-venture and the changes that it brought about to their 
existing work policies and environment. There were a couple of reasons for this negative 
sentiment. 
 
First, the SIP joint-venture as it was initially conceptualized was tabled with the expectations that 
it would lead to spill-over technological and business know-how, generate employment and 
income for residents living within Suzhou, and hence contribute to the overall development of 
the region. The process of technological and knowledge transfer has been successfully with the 
Municipal Government adopting many of Singapore’s processes and policies and adapting them 
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to fit into the specific contexts of Suzhou and its needs. Other areas of the intended spill-over 
effect have been less successful. The first area concerns source of employment. The SIP prided 
itself on recruiting the best talents to work within the park, often stating that a main difference 
between it and other rival industrial parks was in terms of the quality of individuals hired to run 
and manage the day to day workings of the SIP. Its system of recruitment nationwide however, 
meant that the locals in Suzhou were often by-passed in favor of ‘outsiders’ coming from areas 
away from the region. This meant that in reality, the SIP did not particularly help to generate or 
increase local employment rates. Compared to the SIP, the SND contributed significantly more 
towards local employment during the 1990s, hiring on average more individuals from the 
vicinity villages, townships and cities (Table 5.2). Although the SIP placed much effort into 
recruiting candidates with strong educational background, local government statistics reveal that 
the SND had been recruiting large numbers of fresh graduates from universities and other 
professional tertiary institutions even prior to the SIP being set up.  To say that the SIP was 
unique in its emphasis on hiring individuals with strong academic credentials would have been 
an overstatement. 
 
Second, it was always assumed that because of its high standards and international profile, 
coupled with the stringent recruitment criteria, SIP officials and working staff were rewarded 
with better pay incentives than their rival parks, in particular the SND. Indeed, during one 
interview conducted with a senior Chinese bureaucrat who has been with the SIP since 1994 and 
is now heading a department within the SIP, this bureaucrat strongly insisted that ‘all the 
government officials hired to work in the SIP were the best and the brightest, with many of them 
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from the Jiangsu Provincial Government’, and that evidence of this was in the pay structure 
difference between officials at the SIP and the SND. According to this bureaucrat, SIP officials 
and workers definitely ‘paid much higher’ than their counterparts in the SND.  
 
An examination of statistics from the local government however, reveals a different picture. 
Based on local government statistics, bureaucrats working in the SND had on average higher 
basic wages than their counterparts in the SIP during the 1990s (Table 5.3). It may have been the 
case that the SND was paying higher base salaries but that the SIP was offering more terms of 
total remuneration package but information about the bonus and reward structures within the 
SND and SIP could not be obtained for the purpose of this research.  
 
If the SND was contributing more to generating local employment and paying their employees 
higher wages, this could have led to a development and strengthening of an ‘us-them’ mentality, 
whereby the Suzhou Municipal Government was inclined to promote or at least support the 
SND which was originally set up by them (and had shown over time to contribute more to local 
development), versus a foreign set-up that did not perform as well as it should. That some SIP 
employees having undergone software management training in Singapore ended up working for 
the SND is indication that the SND must have been offering equally if not more attractive 
remuneration packages to have been able to entice SIP officials over to work for it (Straits Times, 
18 June 1999). It seemed however, that when it came to the sensitive issue of wages and 
employment policies, the SND and the Suzhou Municipal Government were cautious in openly 
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advertising their benefits and may explain why SIP bureaucrats interviewed strongly insist still 
that their wages were definitely much higher than their counterparts in the SND.  
 
Figure 5.1: Average Wages of Bureau/Department Employees and Officials in the SND and the SIP 
Average Wages of Bureau/Department Employees and 






















Source: Compiled by author with data from local government sources 
Figure 5.2: Urban Employment by the SND and SIP 
Urban Area Employment by the Suzhou New District 































Source: Compiled by author with data from the local government sources 
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Figure 5.3: Employment of Graduates of Colleges, Secondary/Specialized Schools and Skilled Workers Schools 
in the SND and SIP 
Graduates of Colleges, Secondary/Specialized Schools and Skilled 































Source: Compiled by author with data from the local government sources 
 
ii. Revenue Collection – The SIP does not contribute much to the local Suzhou 
Municipal Government  
Another reason why the Suzhou Municipal Government may have been initially resistant to the 
SIP lies in that of tax revenue collection. Because of the structure and privileged position that 
had been conferred upon the SIP, the SIP had a much greater amount of fiscal autonomy 
compared to all its other rival industrial parks. This was particularly significant in the area of tax 
collection whereby unlike the other industrial parks who abide by a standard formula to pass on 
a certain amount of tax revenue generated at the local level to the local government, most of the 
local revenues generated by the SIP apparently stayed within the SIP, rather than going to the 
Suzhou Municipal Government. How SIPAC proportions its revenue to the local government 
however is not known. It was a different story for the SND. In the SND, most of the revenue 
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generated by the economic activity within the SND went clearly to the local government since 
the local government was essentially the owner and developer of the SND. This in itself makes 
already good justification for the local government’s limited enthusiasm for the SIP.   
 
Another reason would be related to the low amount of revenue collected by the SIP especially 
prior to the restructuring in 2001 despite all the additional assistance given to it and this would 
explain why both the Suzhou Municipal Government and the Central Government were 
lukewarm about the SIP.  In 1999, the Central Government announced that it had started to 
phase out preferential tax treatment to dozens of major economic enclaves for foreign-funded 
enterprises and aimed to eliminate favorable tax treatment to the nation’s 44 major ‘economic 
and technology development zones’. Under this new policy, the Central Government reduced 
the rebate rate of its portion of value-added tax and consumption tax to the zones. The Central 
Government halted the tax rebate to industrial zones set up for 10 years while progressively 
reduced the rebate rates to other industrial parks over the next few years. In the sixth year of an 
industrial park’s establishment, the rebate would be lowered to 75 percent. The rebate rates in 
following years would be 50 percent, 25 percent and zero respectively. However, for the SIP, 
special rates were again granted with 60 percent, 40 percent, 20 percent and zero in the five years 
starting 1999. No other industrial park in China was accorded such treatment (Reuters News, 6 
January 1999). One hundred per cent foreign ownership was allowed and manufacturers were 
allowed to sell into domestic markets, an advantage that other industrial parks or high-
technology zones did not have or were limited in scope (Financial Times, 24 February 1995).  
 
 108
Han Minli: National University of Singapore, M.Soc Sci (Political Science) 2008 
Similarly, following Beijing’s decision that foreign-funded projects worth les than US$30 million 
set up after March 31 1996 would no longer enjoy tax exemptions on imported equipment, the 
Central Government acceded to the Singapore Government’s request and decided to continue 
granting duty-free privileges to high-tech investment projects for equipment imports into the SIP 
(Straits Times, 29 April 1997). In a further show of support for the SIP and in response to 
Singapore Government lobbying that more needed to be done for the SIP to ensure its success, 
the Central Government elevated the flagship cooperation project between the two governments 
to the same level as China’s five special economic zones (SEZ) and the Pudong New Area of 
Shanghai (Lu Ning, 18 September 1997).  
 
Despite all these measures, the SIP was still not performing as well as the SND. Statistics show 
however, that even after all these new measures that were implemented from 1997 onward, the 
revenue generated by the SIP was not as good, or just marginally better than the SND prior to 
2001 (figure 5.4). This was already sufficient cause for the Suzhou Municipal Governments to 
re-think whether the SIP was really benefiting it and the rest of Suzhou in terms of revenue 
collected, especially if majority of the revenue generated did not flow out to the local government 
but remained largely in the hands of the SIP’s management. 
 
Likewise, the Central Government may not have been that concerned about the SIP as suggested 
because it too was affected by the takings that the SIP was generating. According to the Tax 
Assignment System revised in 1994, the shared taxes between central and local governments 
consist primarily of value-added tax (VAT) (central 75 percent; local 25 percent), stock 
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transactions gains tax (central 50 percent; local 50 percent), and resource tax which goes 
primarily to local governments (Jiang and Zhao, 1994). As shown above, special rebate rates with 
regards to VAT had already been extended to the SIP. 
 
Figure 5.4: Government Revenue in the SIP and SND 
Government Revenue in the Singapore Suzhou 




























Source: Compiled by author from information from official SIP and SND websites 
 
However in addition to that, all other processed products for export by investors within the SIP 
were also exempted from VAT. This meant that the direct revenue collected by the Central 
Government from the SIP was also significantly affected.  The Central Government’s lack of 
interest in the development of the SIP was confirmed by both Suzhou and Singaporean 
bureaucrats interviewed who revealed that most of the time, the Central Government did not 
keep stock of the day-to-day developments or conflicts between the collaborating parties. 
According them, the Central ‘did not know anything (about the problems) at all’. As such, they 
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were caught off guard by Singapore’s subsequent complaints about the Suzhou Municipal 






















Han Minli: National University of Singapore, M.Soc Sci (Political Science) 2008 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION –  
LESSONS FROM THE SIP 
 
In 2001, the restructuring of the SIP was completed and the Singapore Consortium officially 
became the new minority shareholder of the SIP with the Chinese Consortium and Suzhou 
Municipal Government now taking the lead in the development of the remaining land in the SIP. 
Coincidentally, the SIP started to turn around from 2001 onwards, raking in a sharp increase in 
foreign investment portfolios and also a surge in income revenue. Whether it was the switch in 
‘ownership’ per se or a matter of the SIP maturing that led to the positive growth of the SIP, a 
separate study is warranted to examine the ways in which the external and internal environments 
affecting the development of the SIP have changed or is different from prior to the handover in 
management. Although the SIP has come a long way since its conception in the early 1990s and 
its current model of management and development is different from its initial state, there are still 
lingering feelings that the SIP as it was originally conceived had not succeeded, and that it was 
only after the Chinese Government took over from Singapore, did they manage to put it back on 
track.  
 
Singapore has sought to place the failure of the SIP on the lack of commitment from their 
Chinese counterparts and competition from rival parks. However, this research has shown that 
this was not entirely the case and for the most part, Singapore was partly responsible for how 
things turned out due to a lack of understanding and insufficient preparation for the investment 
and political environment in China. Singapore was also not that quick to adjust to variations in 
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the behavior and requirements of external parties they would work with, such as foreign investors 
who also alter their typical practices to adapt to the local Chinese context.  
 
The SIP was meant to be used as a catalyst for future Sino-Singaporean collaborations and to 
provide a platform by which local Singaporean groups and investors could venture into China 
with. Since the restructuring of the SIP, numerous of large scale projects between the two 
countries at both the government and private levels have taken place. Whether there is a causal 
relationship between the SIP and the proliferation of Singaporean ventures in China remains to 
be studied. Some of the new ventures such as the Singapore-Dalian Eco-Park and the Liaoning 
Industrial Park project bear similarities to the SIP collaboration and Singapore has also sought to 
export its expertise in waste management and water treatment systems to China to help it achieve 
sustainable environmentally friendly policies.  
 
Both the Singapore and Chinese Governments have since tried to downplay and put the episode 
of the SIP restructuring and the associated unhappiness behind them by taking a forward looking 
stance to the SIP collaboration. The latest stage of development in the SIP cooperation focuses 
on a new 10-year target to steer the park towards a high-tech and high value-added economy 
with the aim also of making the SIP a key centre for business process outsourcing (BPO) (Goh, 
The Straits Times, July 11 2007).  An MOU was signed with the Jiangsu Provincial Government 
to work together to adapt Singapore’s developmental experience to other parts of the Jiangsu 
province and to western and central China. Given the similarities in these new developments to 
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the SIP collaboration, it is important to assess the reasons for the success and failure for the SIP 
to prevent making the same mistakes over again. 
 
6.1 How Feasible is the Singapore Model of Development for Export? 
 
The purpose of this research has been to analyze the SIP in its totality to see which aspects of the 
collaboration have been successful, and which have been less fruitful but more importantly, how 
suitable is the Singaporean model of development and its associated policy systems for export? 
The SIP example has clearly demonstrated that there are limitations to transferring the Singapore 
model abroad. Still, despite all the shortfalls to the collaboration, the SIP project has also showed 
that there is still room for Singapore’s policy of ‘regionalism’ to grow if it exercises a suitable 
amount of flexibility in its approach to working and partnering with strategic parties. The 
software transfer program in particular, is an excellent example whereby working within a 
defined area of collaboration, both countries were active and equal participants in the 
transference project. This enabled a two-way process to occur for mutual exchanges and dialogue 
to take place, ensuring that all parties involved saw themselves as having vested interests in 
making this aspect of cooperation a success.  
 
Unlike most other countries, Singapore benefits from having a small population and a dominant 
unitary government that is able to develop and implement policies without excessive 
considerations. Negative repercussions from any policy implementation or shocks can be more 
easily predicted and planned for in advanced as they often occur within controlled borders. This 
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is not so for a country as large and as complex as China. While one of the strengths in the 
Singapore Government has always been its foresight, this ability bears less fruit in areas where 
Singapore has had little or no experience at all. In the SIP case, Singapore’s structured way of 
policy-making and business communication lacked the flexibility and suitability to deal with the 
complex, fluctuating dynamics of and between the local and Chinese Central governments. 
Likewise, this collaboration brings to question the ability of Singapore to deal with direct 
competition head-on on foreign grounds. Singapore does not have to deal with issues of inter or 
intra-regional economic competition, and one of the reasons why the Jurong Township 
Corporation (JTC) has been so successful in recruiting international investors lie in the obvious 
fact that there are no other similar alternatives located within Singapore. However, the situation 
is vastly different in China where industrial park rivalry is extremely competitive and 
comparative advantages are easily eroded or replaced. The Chinese has shown their adaptability 
through the SIP example whereas Singapore revealed some weakness in not being able to pre-
empt situations outside their comfort zone and a lack of flexibility in dealing with changing 
circumstances and human relations. 
 
6.2   What Lessons Can the SIP Offer? 
 
Because the SIP consists of separate components such as the software transfer program and 
interactions between different groups of actors, and diverse sets of issues, this research has shown 
that it is not possible to evaluate the SIP from any one single angle. A lack of results in one area 
does not mean that all other aspects of the collaboration have been unsuccessful. To conduct a 
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meaningful assessment of the SIP, it is necessary to explore all possible causes for the failure and 
success of its program, but more importantly to see how they relate to one another, and what 
lessons can be taken from this experience. The SIP case as demonstrated in this research 
highlights certain factors that Singaporean and other foreign investors should take note of when 
venturing into the Chinese market: 
 
i. Evaluating Strategic Value and Role of Partnership 
Just as there are no permanent friends or enemies in the international political system, there are 
likewise no permanent strategic partners when it comes to pursuing economic interests. As the 
SIP case has demonstrated, there are no monopolies when it comes to collaboration and business 
opportunities especially when both monetary and other intangible forms of benefits are at stake.  
Singapore believed that it was doing the Chinese a favor by volunteering to impart its expertise in 
economic development and nation building and hence the Chinese should live up to their 
promises and commitment that the latter would prioritize the SIP over all existing industrial 
parks in China. However, for very pragmatic purposes, especially when the SIP continually 
underperformed in contrast to its rival park, there were good justification as to why the local and 
Central Chinese Governments saw little benefits in continuing their unabated support for 
Singapore and the SIP. Rather than look for external reasons to justify its lackluster performance, 
Singapore could have also examined the SIP’s internal flaws, and temper its expectations to 
exercise flexibility in its dialogue and bargaining exchanges with the Chinese.  
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While Singapore possesses niche skills and knowledge to make it a valuable partner to the 
Chinese, it should not be overconfident of, or take for granted, its value to China. Before the SIP 
commenced its development, China had already hinted that this collaboration resulted partly 
from coincidence and good timing, and that for the development of industrial parks, Singapore 
was actually behind other countries that already had a significant head-start in working with the 
Chinese Governments. In fact it was not just in the area of industrial park development that 
Singapore was slow in venturing into the Chinese market compared to other countries. This 
made it already lose out in terms of understanding the economic and political climate, and the 
necessities that it had to arm itself with when it came to investing in China. To make its first 
large-scale foray into China based on such a unique and complex collaboration was thus 
extremely risky, for Singapore could not afford the luxury of going through a costly teething 
period for a venture that required so much financial and political support.  
 
The SIP was important for the Chinese authorities at that point of time because it served as a 
‘fast-track’ process in which China could quickly learn the skills required to cope up with the 
changing demands and needs of international investors and thus integrating itself better into the 
international economy. But the value of the SIP decreased as the Chinese became more 
experienced and adapted what they had learnt to suit the particular context and needs of their 
local environment, relying increasingly less on their Singaporean counterparts. China’s reliance 
on Singapore as a source of knowledge also lessened as its economy expanded, allowing it 
multiple opportunities to explore similar collaboration with other parties. An important reason 
why the SIP underperformed it its early days resulted from a mismatch in expectations and value, 
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whereby the Singapore saw its role as being critical to the success of the SIP, but China took a 
more pragmatic approach to it. 
 
ii. Understanding Local Socio-Political and Economic Dynamics 
The SIP experience has shown how complex the political and social dynamics of China is and 
how they can significantly alter the outcome of an investment project, even of one that had 
strong national government support. The SIP’s performance was in part a result of the Singapore 
Government and Consortium not being familiar with the nuances of local government politics 
and how they interact with the Central Government. Singapore’s blind belief that official 
Central Government support would translate or flow down directly to compliance by the Suzhou 
Municipal Government was a mistake, for it failed to sufficiently take into consideration the fact 
that local governments were increasingly independent economic agents who sought to pursue 
their own agendas and interests which were often distinct from those of the Central Government. 
Instead of dialoguing with the local Suzhou Municipal Government to achieve a resolution to 
the problems that surfaced, Singapore often bypassed local authorities to seek direct recourse 
from the Central authorities, thus creating a wedge and atmosphere of mistrust between 
Singapore and the local authorities who felt that their Singaporean counterparts were 
undermining their authority and ‘not giving them face’. However the Singapore Government 
should also not have taken the Central Government’s support for granted as in some cases such 
as revenue collection, the Central Government has vested interests that coincide with those of 
the local government.  
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One of the incentives that the Suzhou Municipal Government had for proceeding with this 
project was that it believed that the SIP would create direct benefits for the city and the 
surrounding regions such as generating employment and a spill-over in the transfer of technology 
and management know-how to local businesses. However, the SIP failed to deliver on these 
expectations and instead, the local authorities found that they were benefiting more from other 
ventures and collaborations such as the SND. This was a clear example of how Singapore’s 
model and practices were not suitable for the local context of Suzhou as its outright policy of 
nation-wide recruitment and recruitment based on meritocracy, alienated and deprived existing 
citizens in Suzhou of new employment opportunities which contributed to its unpopularity with 
the local government.  
 
iii. Awareness of Foreign Investment Patterns and Trends  
The other lesson that Singapore could learn from the SIP collaboration is that its own and earlier 
personal experience with international foreign investors does not necessarily translate to a similar 
outcome away from Singapore’s borders. The primary issue here is that while certain groups of 
foreign investors exert a certain set of fixed behaviors,  they also adapt their practices to adapt to 
the conditions of the different host countries to achieve maximum mileage out of their 
investment and resources. Likewise, patterns of investment also change and are affected by the 
overall investment trend and climate in different countries. The Singapore Government and the 
Consortium had aimed to attract the large and multi-national corporations from the US, Europe 
and also Japan. They were confident that because of their previous experience in attracting this 
profile of investors to Singapore and how they were also familiar with the Singapore model of 
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management, the SIP would thus be a welcoming option for them as the choice investment 
location in China or at least within the Jiangsu Province. 
 
However as the case of the SIP has shown, such assumptions by the Singapore Government 
about foreign investor behavior proved costly for the performance of the park. The SIP was 
meant to act as a jumping board or platform for foreign investors unfamiliar with the Chinese 
system of doing business to venture into the Chinese market. However, many of these foreign 
investors, especially those from Japan and other Asian regional countries, already had quite a 
presence in China by the time the SIP opened and thus the considerations that these 
corporations had in terms of where to locate their investment were vastly different. While the 
SIP’s top notch infrastructure was a draw, other factors such as cost, the location of related 
suppliers and networks, as well as culturally specific business working methods and behavior were 
equally, if not more important for this group of investors. That the Singapore Government did 
not sufficiently consider these investors’ concerns was one of the reasons why it had such 
difficulty in attracting these targets despite having better facilities and tax incentives. This was all 
the more necessary given that the SIP was a late entrant to the development of industrial parks in 
China, and it needed to understand its existing competition and the factors influencing why 
some industrial parks were more successful than others. Because the Singapore Government and 
Consortium were not prepared, other investment locations proved more practical alternatives for 
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iv. Moving Forward 
Amongst Singapore’s key survival strategies to date have been that of exporting its niche skills 
and expertise to other countries and acting as a bridge between markets and regions. However as 
the SIP case demonstrates, it is not easy for Singapore to undertake this role as consultant and 
advisor while balancing its own interests. What has proven to work for Singapore does not 
necessarily translate into something just as viable in other countries especially if Singapore does 
not sufficiently understand the changing requirements of its client countries or recognize that 
there are limitations to its own approaches outside its borders.  Singapore’s strategy of 
regionalism and expanding its influence in the region via such nature of collaborations will have 
a limited, if not, short term impact if it is unable to go beyond just providing ‘consultancy’ 
services in an increasingly connected world where countries have a lot more  options in terms of 
such strategic partnerships. Given China’s own advances in the diplomatic and economic arena, 
Singapore’s role as a ‘teacher, adviser and partner’ is increasingly vulnerable. For Singapore to 
achieve long-term partnership with China or another country, it needs to move away from one-
off collaborations that focus merely on selling its capabilities such as in the case of the SIP as this 
would make it convenient for its partners to look and source for alternative sources 
collaborations once the project is completed. There is an urgent need to look for a more 
integrated approach that will see it being embedded firmly within the Chinese system and seal it 
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